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ABSTRACT 
Human trafficking is a global problem and there are a multitude of factors that 
have contributed to its expansion. Increased trafficking intersectionality with organized 
crime and terrorist networks is threatening U.S. national security, and unfortunately, many 
of the solutions are too broad to be applied to microeconomic markets. 
This study uses system dynamics to model Las Vegas’s commercial sex market 
and an exploratory qualitative approach to model policy changes within the system. This 
study examines prostitution legalization, prostitution abolition, and a hybridization of 
both while investigating improved victim advocacy and resilience education. 
While demand is driving the market, the current U.S. prostitution criminalization 
policy disproportionately punishes suppliers of sex. This paradigm is stigmatizing sex 
workers and exacerbating trafficking victimization. Additionally, policies solely aimed at 
reducing prostitution will likely increase the number of sex trafficking victims if 
sufficient demand exists. Therefore, a combination of policies targeted at 
comprehensively reducing supply and demand may be the most effective method at 
diminishing sex trafficking in Las Vegas. Through this study’s modeling, it appears that a 
combination of abolition and resilience education have the best results, but Nevada policy 
makers must continue to study the nuances of the market to ensure future policy 
effectiveness. 
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This study utilizes System Dynamics (SD) to explore the complex supply and 
demand interactions within the commercial sex industry. The analysis specifically focuses 
on the metropolitan area of Las Vegas and attempts to identify policies capable of 
disrupting sexual exploitation within the market. As prostitution and sex trafficking are 
inextricably linked, several prostitution policies were explored, including Legalization, 
Abolition (Nordic Model), and a combination of the two, known as the Hybrid Model. 
Additionally, Victim Advocacy and Resilience Education policies were incorporated into 
the study. The goal of this work is to provide Nevada and Las Vegas policy makers novel 
insights into the dynamic nonlinear interactions that occur within the city, while also 
providing a foundation for future research on the topic. 
A mixed-methods approach was taken using exploratory modeling of a highly 
uncertain system to gain a better understanding the system’s interactions. A quantitative 
approach was used to build the Base Model as an exploratory representation of Las Vegas’s 
commercial sex market, using data gathered from various sources, including the U.S. 
Census Bureau, the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority (LVCVA), the Nevada 
Coalition to Prevent the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, the Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), and prevailing literature  regarding 
prostitution and sex trafficking within the United States and Las Vegas. Changes were 
incorporated into the Base Model for each policy using qualitative analysis of the policies 
and their possible effects on the sex market. Then, each of the model changes were explored 
individually over a 50-year time horizon. Furthermore, policy combinations were studied 
to account for the possibility of reduced policy success rates. Finally, the best policy was 
tested against a “Worst-Case” Model to account for uncertainty within the illicit system, 
which incorporated the maximum reported stock values across the market.  
A. FINDINGS
The Legalization and Victim Advocacy Models were the least effective at reducing
sexual exploitation within the market. Both policies increased overall supply and demand 
xvi 
relative to the Base Model. Additionally, the Nordic and Hybrid Models were effective at 
reducing the Supply of Prostitutes stock. However, victimization rates increase in both of 
these models as the rate of prostitutes leaving the system increases (reference Table ES-1 
for a policy final stock value comparison). The Resilience Education Model was the most 
successful at reducing the final stock values of supply and demand. However, even this 
policy individually was only effective until about 40 years into the 50-year simulation, 
when demand and victimization rates  begin to accelerate again. 




According to the Base Model, in a criminalized prostitution market like that of Las 
Vegas, where there is a disproportionate emphasis placed on punishing suppliers over 
buyers, demand will continue to grow. As a result, profitability will increase within the 
system, forcing greater amounts of exploitation. If buyers continue to operate with near 
impunity, this trend will likely continue. However, based on the results of this study, a 
policy allowing the legalization of prostitution will likely exacerbate this problem.  
xvii 
A legal system will increase demand. Also, if such a policy incorporates 
prostitution reduction measures, such as diversion or reform, but does not equally increase 
the system’s capacity to identify and rescue trafficking victims, sexual exploitation will 
continue to grow to meet demand growth. Since demand is driving the profitability within 
the market, increasing demand and reducing the prostitution component of supply allows 
traffickers to capitalize on the void in the supply market.  
Applying a Victim Advocacy Policy could be effective, but its focus should not be 
solely on the victim’s component of supply, as the policy was modeled within this study. 
Although the number of victims were reduced, the prostitution and demand stocks 
continued to grow, which eventually caused an increase in victimization toward the end of 
the simulation period.  
Resilience Education was able to reduce all aspects of the market except tourism 
demand, because it created trafficking-resistant populations of children who eventually 
became adults within the system. This caused a reduction in the stocks of prostitutes that 
were willing to enter the sex industry, created harder targets for traffickers to victimize, 
and less prospective local buyers. However, because the success rate of a Resilience 
Education program can never be perfect, as the population growth outpaces the proportion 
of the population on whom  the program is effective , exploitation will begin to increase. 
Exacerbating this effect is the lack of impact that a local Resilience Education policy has 
on tourists.  
Therefore, policy makers should continue to explore the possibility of a Resilience 
Education program in Las Vegas. Also, to account for the effect of population growth and 
tourism, a combination of policies and the possibility of a regional or national education 
program should be considered. Ultimately, any policy that is implemented in Las Vegas 
must comprehensively reduce all stocks within the market. If a disproportionate emphasis 
is placed on one stock over another, the system will eventually adapt to create balance, 
likely causing increased demand and exploitation.  
. 
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Despite more than 150 years of human rights progress, slavery is alive and well. 
Human trafficking (HT) has spread to almost every corner of the earth, and those that are 
victimized are stripped of their inalienable rights as humans. Furthermore, a crime against 
the dignity of one, is a violation against all mankind. As William Lloyd Garrison stated, 
“enslave the liberty of but one human being, and the liberties of the world are put in peril.”1 
Due to its illicit nature and conflation with smuggling and migration, it is difficult 
to identify the magnitude of HT. However, the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimate that there are more than 40 
million victims worldwide.2 Furthermore, the ILO estimates that the trafficking market is 
the second highest grossing illicit market in the world, earning $150 billion (USD) per 
year.3 
A. POLICY HISTORY 
Several international policies have been developed to combat HT. The United 
Nations (UN) made its first efforts to end slavery after World War II. The UN Declaration 
of Human Rights prohibits slavery and the slave trade.4 They subsequently held 
conventions for the Suppression of Trafficking in Persons and the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others in 1949 and the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
                                               
1 “William Lloyd Garrison,” Hilbert College, accessed November 2019, https://www.hilbert.edu/
social-justice-activists/william-lloyd-garrison. 
2 International Labour Office and Walk Free Foundation, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced 
Labour and Forced Marriage, (Geneva, Switzerland: International Labour Office and Walk Free 
Foundation, 2017), 21. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/
publication/wcms_575479.pdf. 
3 “International Labour Standards on Forced Labour,” International Labor Organization, accessed  2 
April 2019, https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/
forced-labour/lang--en/index.htm.  
4 “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, 10 December 1948, 
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
2 
Women and the Rights of Children in 1979 and 1989, respectively.5 However, the 
international policy that is most associated with HT is the UN Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, also known 
as the Palermo Protocol.6 Article three of the Palermo Protocol defines HT as 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability, or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the 
purpose of exploitation.7 
Shortly after the UN passage of the Palermo Protocol, the U.S. created its own 
federal policy to combat HT known as the Victims of Violence and Trafficking Protection 
Act (TVPA).8 Section 103 of the TVPA defines HT as 
the recruitment, harboring, transporting, provision, or obtaining of a person 
for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the 
purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, 
slavery, or forced commercial sex acts.9 
B. GLOBALIZATION 
The growth of HT has been catalyzed by globalization. Globalization is the “closer 
integration of the countries and people of the world … brought about by the enormous 
                                               
5 “Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution 
of Others,”  United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2 December 1949, A/RES/
317, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/TrafficInPersons.aspx; United Nations Human 
Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (18 December 1979), United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, 13, https://www.ohchr.org/
en/professionalinterest/pages/cedaw.aspx; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989), United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, 3, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx. 
6 “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” United Nations 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 15 November 2000, https://www.ohchr.org/en/
professionalinterest/pages/protocoltraffickinginpersons.aspx. 
7 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons.” 
8 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Public Law 106-386, 114 Stat. 1469–73 
(28 October 2000), https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/publ386/PLAW-106publ386.pdf. 
9 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. 
3 
reduction in transportation and communication costs, and the breaking down of artificial 
barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and to a lesser extent, people 
across borders.”10 Although globalization has created countless positive effects, it has also 
aided in the rapid expansion of the commodification of humans. Consumers’ unfettered 
access to goods and services all over the world has expanded the demand in markets that 
would not have experienced such an increase previously. Thus, businesses are forced to 
increase development and production of supply to accommodate demand grow. Such 
expansion is increasingly occurring in the developing world, where construction, 
development labor, and worker’s wages are less costly. These factors culminate in unequal 
development and greater wealth disparities between the developing and affluent 
countries.11  
Furthermore, an inflated supply of immigrant workers can exacerbate market 
competition, ultimately forcing businesses to achieve a competitive advantage by hiring 
immigrant workers at a lower wage. Thus, businesses paying a fair market wage to their 
employees are placed at a disadvantage.12 All these conditions prime the environment for 
trafficking possibilities. While the effects of HT can be locally destabilizing, they can 
eventually have regional, trans-regional, or global impacts. 
C. IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY 
Illicit networks fueled by revenues from HT pose a significant threat to United 
States national security. Those threats are explicitly covered in the 2017 U.S. National 
Security Strategy. The major themes President Trump discusses are, “preservation of the 
American way of life,” such as our economy, sovereignty, and values; “promoting 
prosperity, preserving peace”; and “advancing American influence around the world 
                                               
10 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (Norton: New York, 2002), 9. 
11 Louise Shelley, Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 45. 
12 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 3; Noël Bridget Busch-Armendariz, Maura Nsonwu, and Laurie Cook 
Heffron, Human Trafficking: Applying Research, Theory, and Case Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 2017), 127. 
4 
against terrorism and international criminal organizations.”13 Illicit networks have invaded 
macroeconomic markets, destroyed local economies, increased the burden on law 
enforcement agencies, and decreased the welfare of the general populace, seeking to 
destabilize the legal and political systems by undermining the rule of law, free press, and 
democratic institutions.14 U.S. security is reliant on ensuring American prosperity and 
values. However, if corruption and instability engulf entire regions of the world, U.S. 
security will be threatened by the unavoidable rise of organized crime and its increasing 
intersection with terrorist networks.  
The market for HT has become increasingly appealing to terrorist organizations for 
several reasons. First, trafficking persons allows for an alternate source of funding with 
counterterrorism efforts constricting money flows from drug and arms sales. Due to U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts against sources of illicit funding, terrorist organizations are 
increasing partnerships with criminal organizations to seek alternative sources of capital. 
Although the terrorist and criminal networks have different goals, their cooperation 
provides an opportunity for undetected gains, and a means to an end for both criminal and 
terrorist organizations.15 In 2016, HT supplied between $10 million and $30 million to the 
Islamic State (IS).16  
The second reason terrorists are using trafficking is to incite fear. As of 2017, IS 
had enslaved around 5,000 women and trafficked them around the region to suppress or 
                                               
13 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), I-II, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
14 Elizabeth M. Wheaton,, Edward J. Schauer, and Thomas V. Galli, “Economics of Human 
Trafficking,” International Migration 48, no. 4 (2010), 132; Duncan Deville, “The Illicit Supply Chain” in 
Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, ed. Michael Miklaucic 
and Jaqueline Brewer (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), 63, 72; Sandra L. 
Keefer, “Human Trafficking and the Impact on National Security for the United States” (master’s thesis, 
Army War College, 2006), 4, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a448573.pdf. 
15 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 312; Thomas M Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized 
Crime: Blurring the Lines,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 24, no. 1 (2004), 49. 
16 Shannon A. Welch, “Human Trafficking and Terrorism: Utilizing National Security Resources to 
Prevent Human Trafficking in the Islamic State,” Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy, 24, no. 165 
(2016), 179–180, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1318&context=djglp; Nikita 
Malik, Trafficking Terror: How Modern Slavery and Sexual Violence Fund Terrorism, (London: The 
Henry Jackson Society, 2017), iv, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-
Trafficking-Terror-Report-web.pdf; Welch, “Human Trafficking and Terrorism,” 180. 
5 
cleanse communities and facilitate psychological defeat.17 Finally, trafficking is being 
used for recruiting. Propaganda of sexual slavery is used to entice would-be extremists 
under the guise of punishing non-believers through religiously justified rape.18 Boko 
Haram has also taken to the practice of forced pregnancies and conversions to supply the 
next generation of jihad fighters.19 Due to the global implications of HT, most of the 
research and policy recommendations have focused on broad implementation of anti-
trafficking measures. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
How can a problem on such a global scale be corrected? Many scholars across 
multiple disciplines, including criminal justice, social work, public health, and economics, 
have addressed the subject. All of these disciplines have studied typologies of victims, 
traffickers, and buyers, using sociodemographic variables to identify vulnerable 
populations.20 Other criminally focused studies have provided insights into illicit 
                                               
17 Welch, “Human Trafficking and Terrorism,” 168; Ashley Binetti, A New Frontier: Human 
Trafficking and ISIS’s Recruitment of Women from the West, (Washington, DC: Georgetown Institute for 
Women, Peace, and Security, 2015), 1, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Human-
Trafficking-and-ISISs-Recruitment-of-Women-from-the-West.pdf.Bin 
18 Malik, Trafficking Terror, iv; Welch, “Human Trafficking and Terrorism,” 168. 
19 Malik, Trafficking Terror, iv. 
20 Meredith L Dank et al., Estimating the Size and Structure of the Underground Commercial Sex 
Economy in Eight Major U.S. Cities, (Washington, DC, Urban Institute, 2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/publication/22376/413047-estimating-the-size-and-structure-of-the-underground-commercial-
sex-economy-in-eight-major-us-cities.pdf; Alexis Aronowitz, Gerda Theuermann, and Elena Tyurykanova, 
Analysing the Business Model of Trafficking in Human Beings to Better Prevent the Crime (Vienna:. OSCE 
Office to the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, 2010), 
https://www.osce.org/secretariat/69028?download=true; Niklas Jakobsson and Andreas Kotsadam, “The 
Law and Economics of International Sex Slavery: Prostitution Laws and Trafficking for Sexual 
Exploitation,” European Journal of Law and Economics 35, no. 1 (2013), https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/
2077/22825/4/gupea_2077_22825_4.pdf; Wheaton, Schauer, and Galli, “Economics of Human 
Trafficking”; Mun Heng TOH and Bo JIANG, “Human Trafficking–Socio-Economic Determinants: Cross 
Countries Analysis,” International Journal of Business and Social Science 8, no. 9 (2017), 
http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_8_No_9_September_2017/2.pdf; David Okech et al., “Seventeen Years of 
Human Trafficking Research in Social Work: A review of the Literature,” Journal of Evidence-Informed 
Social Work 15, no. 2 (2018), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David_Okech/publication/
321991147_Seventeen_years_of_human_trafficking_research_in_social_work_A_review_of_the_
literature/links/5a4cf4bf0f7e9b8284c4ac63/Seventeen-years-of-human-trafficking-research-in-social-work-
A-review-of-the-literature.pdf; B. Anthony et al., Typology of Modern Slavery: Defining Sex and Labor 
Trafficking in the US, (Vancouver, WA: Polaris Project, 2017), https://polarisproject.org/sites/default/files/
Polaris-Typology-of-Modern-Slavery.pdf. 
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networks, venues of sales, and movement of victims, to better understand organizational 
structure, communication, and flows of commodities.21 Most social work and public health 
related research focuses on victim care and rehabilitation including survivor-centric, 
trauma-informed, and culturally oriented approaches, as well as the victim’s long-term 
physical and psychological needs.22  
Whereas most of the prior research is reactive, or conducted once a victim is 
identified, economists have generally focused on proactive measures to identify and attack 
vulnerable aspects of the HT economic market. Like any economic market, the HT system 
is characterized by supply and demand. Supply disruption studies focus on stemming the 
flow of victims through prostitution policy measures and diversion reform programs.23 
Demand reduction studies have discussed buyer deterrence measures such as reform 
schools.24 Most of these studies conclude that supply or demand side measures are not 
sufficient to combat HT, and a combination of policies targeted at both sides of the market 
                                               
21 Shelley, Human Trafficking; Busch-Armendariz, Nsonwu, and Cook Heffron. Human Trafficking: 
Applying Research, Theory, and Case Studies; Financial Action Task Force and Asia Pacific Group, 
Financial Flows from Human Trafficking: Financial Action Task Force Report (Paris, Financial Action 
Task Force and Asia Pacific Group, 2018), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/Human-
Trafficking-2018.pdf. 
22 Okech et al., “Seventeen years of human trafficking research”; Busch-Armendariz, Nsonwu, and 
Cook Heffron, Human Trafficking: Applying Research, Theory, and Case Studies. 
23 Melanie Basil, “Pushing for New Perspectives: Policy Model of Criminalized Prostitution and its 
Effect on Victims of Sex Trafficking,” (master’s thesis, University of Washington, 2015), 
https://digitalcommons.tacoma.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=gh_theses; S. Cho, A. 
Dreher, and E. Neumayer, “Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking?” World Development 
41 (2013), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/45198/1/Neumayer_Legalized_Prostitution_Increase_2012.pdf; 
Jakobsson and Kotsadam, “The Law and Economics of International Sex Slavery”; Melissa Farley, 
Prostitution and Trafficking in Nevada: Making the Connections (San Francisco, CA: Prostitution Research 
& Education, 2007);  
23 Sarah Schweig, Danielle Malangone, and Miriam Goodman, Prostitution Diversion Programs 
(New York: Center for Court Innovations, 2012), 207, http://www. courtinnovation. org/sites/default/files/
documents/CI_Prostitution. 
24 Donna M. Hughes, “Combating Sex Trafficking: A Perpetrator-Focused Approach,” University of 
St. Thomas Law Journal 6 (2008), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5bf2/
c4d5344d07397dc7da11641852da177473bc.pdf; Martin A. Monto, and Steve Garcia, “Recidivism Among 
the Customers of Female Street Prostitutes: Do Intervention Programs Help,” Western Criminology Review 
3, no. 2 (2001), http://westerncriminology.org/documents/WCR/v03n2/monto/monto.html. 
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may be required to topple these illicit networks.25 A System Dynamics (SD) study has 
been conducted to offer insights into sex trafficking policies’ effects on the economic 
market.26  
However, much of the previous research has focused on a scale too large to draw 
useful conclusions on specific locations and the unique systems that are associated with 
them. Since trafficking markets are unique to their locations, some argue that efforts to 
disrupt markets in one location may not be effective, or could even be counterproductive, 
in other locations.27 Therefore, more research must be executed for specific micro-
economic markets.28 It may be necessary to reduce the aperture of a study to a very specific 
system of systems to draw relevant policy conclusions. Although targeting supply and 
demand separately may not be sufficient to disrupt HT, some argue that eliminating supply 
is impossible without first eliminating the demand.29 Furthermore, one researcher claims 
that demand is a function of culture, and without altering the culture of the system, the 
market cannot be altered.30  
One possible way to alter culture, thereby limiting the pool of potential victims, 
traffickers, and buyers is through early intervention education programs. There is a plethora 
of literature regarding youth intervention programs that span topics from pregnancy 
                                               
25 András Kővári and Erik Pruyt, “A Model-Based Exploration and Policy Analysis Related to 
Prostitution and Human Trafficking,” International Journal of System Dynamics Applications (IJSDA) 3, 
no. 4 (2014), 53, https://www.igi-global.com/gateway/article/full-text-pdf/122111&riu=true; Cho, Dreher, 
and Neumayer, “Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking?” 2; Jakobsson and Kotsadam, 
“The Law and Economics of International Sex Slavery,” 8. 
26 Kővári and Pruyt, “A Model-Based Exploration.” 
27 Kovari and Pruyt “A Model Based Exploration,” 36. 
28 Ronald Weitzer, “New Directions in Research on Human Trafficking,” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 653, no. 1 (2014), 21, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
pdf/10.1177/0002716214521562. 
29 Hughes, “Combating Sex trafficking,” 43 
30 Shared Hope International, Demand: A Comparative Examination of Sex Tourism and Trafficking 
in Jamaica, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States, (Vancouver, WA: Shared Hope International, 
2007), 2, https://sharedhope.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/DEMAND.pdf. 
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prevention and abstinence, alcohol and drug avoidance, to Resilience Education.31 
However, there is little apparent investigation into how resilience training can be used to 
deter children from becoming victims of HT. One such study, conducted in Atlanta, 
Georgia, attempted to teach children the resiliency skills required to avoid the sex 
trafficking industry.32 Unfortunately, this program lacks specific skills regarding practical 
sex trafficking scenarios. Furthermore, it did not address the education of children on the 
ill effects of becoming a trafficker or buyer of sex. This thesis builds on previous literature 
focused on the sex trafficking market in Las Vegas, Nevada, specifically, its 
interrelationship with prostitution policy and an over-sexualized culture. A System 
Dynamics model will be presented to simulate long term policy changes, and their effects 
on the illicit sex industry.  
31 Emily A. Hennessy and Emily E. Tanner-Smith, “Effectiveness of Brief School-Based Interventions for 
Adolescents: A Meta-Analysis of Alcohol use Prevention Programs,” Prevention Science 16, no. 3 (2015), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4636019/; Gilbert J. Botvin et al., “Effectiveness of Culturally 
Focused and Generic Skills Training Approaches to Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Among Minority 
Adolescents: Two-Year Follow-Up Results,” Psychology of Addictive Behaviors 9, no. 3 (1995), 
http://www.ascodes.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Effectiveness-of-Culturally-Focused-and-Generic-
Skills.pdf; Gilbert J. Botvin et al., “Long-Term Follow-Up Results of a Randomized Drug Abuse Prevention 
Trial in a White Middle-Class Population,” Jama 273, no. 14 (1995), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.566.2695&rep=rep1&type=pdf; Douglas Kirby, “Research on Effectiveness of Sex 
Education Programs,” Theory into Practice 28, no. 3 (1989), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1476620.pdf?
refreqid=excelsior%3A768c7c1bf301ab22ecf9b805c6e1c1ce; Douglas Kirby, and Judith Alter, “The Experts 
Rate Important Features and Outcomes of Sex Education Programs,” Journal of School Health 50, no. 9 
(1980); Kathleen Bodisch Lynch, Susan Rose Geller, and Melinda G. Schmidt, “Multi-Year Evaluation of the 
Effectiveness of a Resilience-Based Prevention Program for Young Children,” Journal of Primary Prevention 
24, no. 3 (2004); Sonia Jain et al., “Protective Factors for Youth Exposed to Violence: Role of Developmental 
Assets in Building Emotional Resilience,” Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice 10, no. 1 (2012), 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1541204011424735; Kylie G Oliver et al., “Building Resilience 
in Young People Through Meaningful Participation,” Australian e-Journal for the Advancement of Mental 
Health 5, no. 1 (2006), https://researchonline.jcu.edu.au/3691/1/3691_Oliver_et_al_2006.pdf. 
32 Kendra C. Taylor, “Teaching Decision-Making and Building Resilience in Youth–A Case Study to 
Reduce the Supply of Vulnerable Youth to Sex Traffickers in Atlanta, Georgia,” European Journal of 
Operational Research 268, no. 3 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.067. 
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II. SEX TRAFFICKING 
Over two dozen typologies of HT have been identified, but it can generally be 
categorized as labor or sexual exploitation.33 The TVPA defines sex trafficking as a 
“compelled commercial sex act” against an adult victim or any “commercial sexual 
exploitation of a minor.”34 Generally, sex trafficking is more prevalent than labor trafficking 
in affluent countries, and is primarily comprised of female and child victims.35 Furthermore, 
trafficking within the U.S. is unique from other affluent Western countries in that the market 
is composed of younger, mostly domestic, victims.36 In 2015, the Urban Institute, a nonprofit 
social and economic policy research organization, reported that victims within the U.S. 
commercial sex market varied between the ages of 7 and 22, with an average age of 17 years 
old.37 American sexual culture has evolved to reinforce youthful sexuality and juvenile 
commodification within the sex market, and is being reinforced by the current criminalization 
prostitution policies. 
A. SEX CULTURE IN AMERICA 
Western culture has increased the normalization of sexualized youth and a gendered 
double standard toward the sale of sex, exacerbating inequalities. Research suggests the 
market’s reliance on youthful commodities is due to “hypersexualized culture” and the 
“commodification of flesh” from increased commercialization of sexuality as a “central 
                                               
33 Anthony et al., The Typology of Modern Slavery. 
34 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. 
35 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, (New York: 
United Nations, December 2018), 8–9, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2018/
GLOTiP_2018_BOOK_web_small.pdf. 
36 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 229. 
37 Andrea J. Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the United States: Theory, Research, Policy, and Practice (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 85; Shelley, Human Trafficking, 229. 
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component of late-capitalist consumer culture.”38 Western society is inundated with 
consumerism, driven by advertising. Many advertisements objectify women, depicting them 
in vulnerable, sexually provocative positions, while presenting men as powerful and 
prominent.39 According to Brents and Sanders, using sex and sexuality to sell legitimate 
commodities in Western markets has created the “pornification of culture,” liberalization of 
sexual attitudes, and increased the tendency to treat intimate relationships as dispensable.40 
Advertising has combined “pornification” with more youthful models and an obsessive 
objection toward aging.41 Over the last few decades, female models have gotten thinner, with 
less of a fully developed female figure, promoting a girl-like appearance.42 Consequently, 
Americans have become obsessed with maintaining their youth, from emulating fashion 
models and age defying skin products, to medication to improve male sexual performance. 
This is blurring the lines between looking and feeling young and subjecting youth to a 
sexualized social atmosphere at a younger age.43 
There is also a growing “hedonistic search” for fantasy and voyeurism, that is 
decreasingly checked by religion as a sexual regulator.44 Sexual objectification of younger 
women and girls is also being normalized in pornography. The adult film industry fetishizes 
adolescents and devalues families by promoting sexual fantasies of schoolgirls and 
                                               
38 David A. Makin, and Caroline Bye, “Commodification of Flesh: Data Visualization Techniques and 
Interest in the Licit Sex Industry,” Deviant Behavior 39, no. 1 (2018), 1, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/
David_Makin4/publication/311731368_Commodification_of_Flesh_Data_Visualization_Techniques_
and_Interest_in_the_Licit_Sex_Industry/links/5942b306a6fdccb93ab26624/Commodification-of-Flesh-Data-
Visualization-Techniques-and-Interest-in-the-Licit-Sex-Industry.pdf; Barbara G. Brents, and Teela Sanders, 
“Mainstreaming the Sex Industry: Economic Inclusion and Social Ambivalence,” Journal of Law and Society 
37, no. 1 (2010), 45, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25622007.pdf; Brooke M. Wagner, Jennifer M. 
Whitmer, and Andrew L. Spivak, Experiences of Youth in the Sex Trade in Las Vegas, (New York: Center for 
Court Innovation, 2016), 2, http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/
Las%20Vegas_0.pdf. 
39 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 50. 
40 Brents and Sanders, “Mainstreaming the Sex Industry,” 45. 
41 Busch-Armendariz, Nsonwu, and Cook Heffron. Human Trafficking: Applying Research, Theory, and 
Case Studies, 185. 
42 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 50. 
43 Busch-Armendariz, Nsonwu, and Cook Heffron. Human Trafficking: Applying Research, Theory, and 
Case Studies, 185. 
44 Brents and Sanders, “Mainstreaming the Sex Industry,” 45. 
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stepdaughters, both of which increase desires for underage girls.45 This sexualization of youth 
creates the desire for younger victims, causing traffickers to increase their supply of children. 
Busch-Armendariz, Nsonwu, and Cook Heffron illustrate this concept by pointing out that a 
society that encourages sexual promiscuity and the debasement of family sanctity, while 
simultaneously “coveting the innocence of youth,” creates a demand for young victims that 
will “rise to meet the glorification of underage sexuality.”46 Furthermore, cultural acceptance 
of juvenile sexuality will likely perpetuate the sex trafficking problem and fuel the sex market. 
As the supply of human sexual commodities increases, social norms will change to 
justify the new reality. For example, as more family members enter into prostitution, new 
perceptions of the sex industry as glamorous, wealth producing, or a social acceptable 
occupational option, will develop.47 Additionally, social networks will begin to incorporate 
these new cultural norms, with friends recruiting each other into the sex industry because they 
are “brainwashed to believe in the social contexts where sex work seemed integral to their 
peer networks.”48 This may eventually result in reduced sociocultural entry barriers to the sex 
market, while reinforcing current exit barriers.  
Although American culture inadvertently promotes youth in the sex industry by 
glamorizes underage sexuality, it also highly stigmatizes prostitution and the victims of the 
commercial sex market.49 Unfortunately, this prevents victims from exiting because they 
avoid the police for fear of legal ramifications, or may feel unable to perform other jobs 
45 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 51. 
46 Busch-Armendariz, Nsonwu, and Cook Heffron. Human Trafficking: Applying Research, Theory, and 
Case Studies, 185. 
47 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 241. 
48 Michelle R. Lillie, An Unholy Alliance: The Connection Between Foster Care and Human Trafficking, 
(Brooklyn: O. L. Pathy Family Foundation, 2013), 11; Farley, Prostitution and Trafficking in Nevada, 112. 
49Alexis Kennedy, and Nicole Joey Pucci, Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking: Las Vegas, Nevada, 
Vancouver, WA: Shared Hope International), 14, 16, http://alexiskennedy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/
Las-Vegas-SH-Assessment.pdf; Brents and Sanders, “Mainstreaming the Sex Industry,” 56–57; Basil, 
“Pushing for New Perspectives,” 13, 15–16; Wagner, Whitmer, and Spivak, Experiences of Youth, 36; Sarah 
Jane Blithe, Anna Wiederhold Wolfe, and Breanna Mohr, Sex and Stigma: Stories of Everyday Life in 
Nevada’s Legal Brothels (New York: NYU Press, 2019), 6. 
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outside of the sex industry due to social stigma and a criminal history.50 This creates a market 
where the suppliers can easily enter, but subsequently feel trapped. This cultural vilification 
of prostitutes and victims is intensified by America’s reverence toward pimps. 
Pimping is pervasive throughout American pop culture including music, television, 
books, clothes, and video games. The word pimp has evolved in American lexicon to represent 
something of power or respect, while pimps themselves are seen as iconic and worthy of 
emulation.51 In 2006, the Academy Award for Best Original Song was awarded to “It’s Hard 
Out Here for a Pimp,” from the movie Hustle and Flow.52 Public events like the Master 
Players Ball, celebrate the achievements of pimps, attracting celebrities like P. Diddy. The 
ball is sanctioned by media outlets, corporations, and local political figures, while HBO and 
Netflix have even televised the event.53 These actions signal to the American people that 
pimping is an accepted normalized practice and those who have achieved a “heightened” pimp 
status should be celebrated rather than admonished.54 It also reaffirms gender inequalities by 
demonstrating that prostitutes deserve to be treated as criminals, while pimps deserve public 
accolades and celebrity. These forms of “glorification combined with marginalization and 
victimization create a social environment primed for sex trafficking.”55 As a result of this 
late-capitalist transition toward sexualization, the sex market has become more diversified and 
profitable. 
B. THE ECONOMICS OF THE SEX MARKET 
The commercial sex economy not only includes prostitution and sex trafficking, but 
also incorporates all forms of pornography, adult toys and paraphernalia stores, strip clubs, 
                                               
50 Rachel Swaner et al., Youth Involvement in the Sex Trade: A National Study, (New York: Center for 
Court Innovation, 2016), 5; Forrey, “Disneyland of Sex,” 10; Farley, Prostitution and Trafficking in 
Nevada,163. 
51 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 125. 
52 Shared Hope International, Demand., 93. 
53 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 129. 
54 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 129. 
55 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 138. 
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webcams, erotic massage parlors and salons, private sex clubs, and brothels.56 Commercial 
sex is a multi-billion-dollar industry in the U.S. In 2018, the adult store business grossed more 
than $9 billion, while the budding pornographic webcam niche is expected to make $10 billion 
by 2020.57 Although sex trafficking can occur within multiple facets of the commercial sex 
industry, it is most commonly perpetrated in venues associated with prostitution, to include 
street solicitation, escort services, brothels, and massage parlors.58 Sex traffickers are 
dependent on the commodification of sex that prostitution creates. Sex trafficking victims will 
naturally be sold in locations that have existing, thriving prostitution markets.  
Much like other commodities, the market underpinning sex trafficking is driven by 
demand. Demand Theory examines the “intricacies of the dependencies between supply and 
demand, and price, with a focus on the overall volume of buyers, and the threshold of 
willingness to spend assets on a product or service.”59 The underground commercial sex 
market is thought to be monopolistic, with very little competition, few market entry costs, and 
limited market regulations.60 In most markets, supply and demand are interdependent. 
However, in the sex market, some believe that the demand for sex drives the supply, and 
where the supply of willing prostitutes is exhausted, victimization will ensue.61 Even with its 
dominant influence on the sex market, demand in America is thought to be elastic, as it is 
inversely related to the price of the commodity.62 While a trafficker’s objective is to maximize 
profits, the consumer’s goal is to minimize cost and maximize the quality of the product or 
                                               
56 Rachel R. Macfarlane et al., “Sex Industry and Sex Workers in Nevada,” In The Social Health of 
Nevada: Leading Indicators and Quality of Life in the Silver State, edited by Dmitri N. Shalin (Las Vegas, NV: 
UNLV Center for Democratic Culture, 2017), 1–4, http://cdclv.unlv.edu/healthnv_2017/sex_work.pdf. 
57 MacFarlane et al., “Sex Industry and Sex Workers in Nevada,”4, 12. 
58 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US,140-141; Dank et al., Estimating the Size and Structure, 3; Shared 
Hope International, “Demand.,” 87. 
59 Busch-Armendariz, Nsonwu, and Cook Heffron. Human Trafficking: Applying Research, Theory, and 
Case Studies, 120. 
60 Wheaton, Schauer, and Galli “Economics of Human Trafficking,” 118; Aronowitz, Theuermann, and 
Tyurykanova, Analysing the Business Model of Trafficking, 32. 
61 Gillian Wylie and Penelope McRedmond, Human Trafficking in Europe: Character, Causes and 
Consequences (New York: Springer, 2010), 129; Wheaton, Schauer, and Galli “Economics of Human 
Trafficking,” 120. 
62 Aronowitz, Theuermann, and Tyurykanova, Analysing the Business Model of Trafficking, 32. 
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service received. Hence, as traffickers attempt to increase prices during periods of peak 
demand, consumers will eventually be deterred from the market once the price reaches a 
subjective price cap. Consequently, traffickers are always attempting to find the equilibrium 
between the cost of sustaining a supply of victims, and the revenue it produces.63 
Furthermore, increasing the supply, may also reduce revenue once the added supply creates a 
surplus of competition. An increase in market competition reduces the average price the 
consumer is willing to pay for the commodity. Therefore, a surplus of victims will decrease 
profits. Unfortunately, for sex trafficking victims, “as long as sex services are provided, there 
will be a population willing to pay for them.”64 The sex market economic composition, 
follows a supply chain resembling other licit market paradigms. Thus, the sex trafficking 
supply chain can be divided into five categories: product, suppliers, wholesalers/retailers, and 
consumers. The rest of this chapter will discuss these components of the market in the U.S. 
and Las Vegas (see Figure 1 for a depiction of the commercial sex market supply chain). 
 
Figure 1. The Supply Chain within the Marketplace of Victimization65 
                                               
63 Wheaton, Schauer, and Galli “Economics of Human Trafficking,” 125. 
64 Wheaton, Schauer, and Galli “Economics of Human Trafficking,” 130. 
65 Adapted from Shared Hope International, Demand., 16. 
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C. SEX MARKET SUPPLY CHAIN 
1. Product 
Traffickers target marginalized populations of people because they are easier to 
manipulate into the sex trade. One commonly victimized population is young people. Younger 
victims are easier to control and are often sought by consumers, as a “unique selling point” 
within the market, allowing traffickers to charge more.66 Additionally, Research suggests that 
the average victim entering the sex market is 16 years old and will “age out,” or become less 
desirable due to age, by their mid-twenties.67 Along with targeting women and children, 
homosexual, bisexual, and transgender youth are also victimized by traffickers.  
Parental rejection or expulsion from the home increases the chances that gay male 
teens and transgender girls will enter the commercial sex market. Sexual transactions may 
initially occur to satisfy survival needs while homeless, but more than 30% become sexually 
exploited within a couple of days of being on the street.68 Among the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, and Queer/Questioning (LGBTQ) community, somewhere between 75,000 and 
200,000 marginalized people are at risk for being trafficked.69 The impoverished are another 
demographic that may be more vulnerable to trafficker exploitation.  
According to the 2017 American Community Survey, more than 45 million 
Americans currently live below the poverty line.70 Within impoverished communities, 
minorities have a higher chance of being exploited in the sex market. Among minority races, 
African Americans, Hispanics and Latinos, and Native Americans and Alaskan Natives are 
disproportionately victimized in sex trafficking cases.71 Constantly living below the poverty 
                                               
66 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 85. 
67 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 85. 
68 Lillie, Unholy Alliance, 9. 
69 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 87. 
70 U.S. Census Bureau, “Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months: 2013–2017 American Community Survey 
5-year Estimates,” accessed April 2019, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/
productview.xhtml?src=CF. 
71 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 90; Patricia Spencer et al., 2014 Las Vegas Sex Trafficking Case 
Study, (Washington, DC: McCain Institute, 2017), 14; Wagner, Whitmer and Spivak, Experiences of Youth, 2. 
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line forces guardians to sell themselves or their children into the sex trade for subsistence, 
while “willing” entry into the market can eventually lead to victimization.72 Additionally, 
higher levels of crime and violence in these areas also increases the likelihood that 
marginalized people will turn to other forms of criminal activity to earn a wage. Many 
traffickers in America have previous criminal records of violent crimes and have exited the 
drug trade to take part in sex trafficking.73 In the U.S., many traffickers and victims originate 
from the same communities, indicating marginalized people are not only products of the sex 
trafficking industry but also suppliers.74 Within Las Vegas, tourism and a hypersexualized 
culture are driving forces for women to become commodities in the sex market. 
2. Product in Las Vegas 
Las Vegas was built in 1905 as a railroad town that catered to rail workers and miners. 
Over the next 50 years, gambling, saloons, and brothels were “anchoring businesses” for the 
budding city.75 However, in 1955, federal pressure forced city officials to outlaw and close 
brothels within city limits; a state law that still exists today.76 Although prostitution has been 
illegal in Las Vegas for more than 60 years, Nevada is still the only state in America with 
legalized prostitution. Holding on to its heritage of vice, Nevada allows the purchase of sex 
in 10 of its 17 counties.77 Since the 1950s, Las Vegas has grown into one of the top tourist 
destinations in the U.S. with the help of the gaming industry. Today, tourism is the largest 
contributor to the city’s economy with more than 84 million visitors between 2017 and 2018, 
                                               
72 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 53. 
73 Dank et al., Estimating the Size and Structure, 147; Busch-Armendariz, Nsonwu, and Cook Heffron. 
Human Trafficking: Applying Research, Theory, and Case Studies, 181. 
74 Busch-Armendariz, Nsonwu, and Cook Heffron. Human Trafficking: Applying Research, Theory, and 
Case Studies, 184; Lauren Martin and Alexandra Pierce, Mapping the market for sex with trafficked minor girls 
in Minneapolis: Structures, functions, and patterns, Minneapolis, MN: Urban Research and Outreach-
Engagement Center, University of Minnesota, 2014, 27, https://uroc.umn.edu/sites/uroc.umn.edu/files/
MTM_Full%20Report_2014.pdf. 
75 Marie Katherine Rowley, “‘So Much for Fond Five-Dollar Memories’: Prostitution in Las Vegas, 
1905–1955” (master’s thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2012), 3. 
76 Rowley, ““So Much for Fond Five-Dollar Memories,”“ 3. 
77 MacFarlane et al., “Sex Industry and Sex Workers in Nevada,” 10.  
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generating more than $20 billion in gaming revenue alone.78 Accordingly, the city is highly 
dependent on tourism, with almost one-third of all southern Nevada employment sourced to 
the industry and 20% of the state’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) tied to tourism.79  
Although selling sex within Clark County remains illegal, Las Vegas thrives on selling 
sexuality and adult entertainment, and has many pseudonyms referring to its sexual persona 
including Sin City, the Disneyland of Sex, and the Bangkok of America.80 Marketing Las 
Vegas as an adult playground with an elevated social tolerance for promiscuity, has created 
the aura that surrounds the “What Happens in Vegas” slogan.  
Additionally, legal brothels within 70 miles of Las Vegas, increase its appeal for sex 
tourism. As Brents and Hausbeck point out, the legal brothel system and tourism are 
symbiotic, and without the steady flow of tourist buyers, brothels would have been 
outlawed.81 On the Las Vegas strip, high end resorts have made efforts to “cleanse” visible 
forms of vice by cracking down on street prostitution, but the sex economy is a large driving 
force behind the city’s tourism.82 Thus, these resorts have sought a balance between overt 
sexual exploitation, which would deter a large portion of the tourist base, and covert 
underground marketing of the sex economy. Consequently, the “line between strip clubs and 
high-end nightclubs/casinos is becoming blurred.”83 Resorts are now using normalized sexual 
expectations of the city to market themselves with scantily clad pole dancers, topless pools, 
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and high-end adult entertainment venues such as Absinthe, Zumanity, X Burlesque, Fantasy, 
Thunder From Down Under, and Chippendales.84 Additionally, many suspect that top resorts 
are providing high-class female “escorts” for very important customers.85  
There is an interdependency between the legal and illegal commercial sex economy 
in Nevada. For example, while more than 400,000 men are serviced by Nevada’s legal 
brothels per year, the majority of those men are also patronizing the sex industry in Las Vegas, 
both legal and illegal.86 Las Vegas has about 30 strip clubs, gentlemen’s’ clubs, and exotic 
dance establishments, which employ as many as 100,000 dancers.87 Pimps and traffickers 
have been known to move victims within the strip club and brothel network, traversing the 
licit and illicit aspects of the market to avoid detection.88 Illegal prostitution is also a dominant 
component within Las Vegas’ sex industry. While legal brothels elsewhere in Nevada have 
almost a half million customers a year, it is believed that they only constitute 10% of the total 
prostitution sales in the state.89 It is estimated that Las Vegas has between 3,500 and 30,000 
illegal prostitutes that generate annual revenues between $550 million and $6 billion per 
year.90 Along with illegal prostitution, sex trafficking is the other component within the 
supply chain. 
Although specific literature about trafficking operations in Las Vegas is limited, one 
study conducted in 2014 by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and 
the Arizona State University Office of Sex Trafficking Intervention and Research (ASU 
STIR), may shed some light on details on the victims within the market. According to the 
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study, almost 80% of the victims within Las Vegas’ trafficking market were Nevadans, moved 
intrastate between industry venues.91 Additionally, almost two-thirds of the underage victims 
were African-American, while the adult victims were equally comprised of White, African-
American, and Hispanic/Latino races.92 Finally, the same study found that almost two-thirds 
of the victims identified were minors, and all of the victims, regardless of age, were female.93  
The fact that minors constitute a portion of the Las Vegas sex trafficking market is a 
well-documented problem. Shared Hope International, a non-profit, nongovernmental, 
Christian organization dedicated to eradicating sex trafficking, documented that a Las Vegas 
outreach program identified more than 400 underage prostitutes in 2007 alone.94 As of 2018, 
the Nevada Coalition to Prevent the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children estimated 
5,687 underage sex trafficking victims within Nevada.95 Additionally, according to the 
Nevada Crime Report, between the years of 2014 and 2017, there were more than 250 
underage victims arrested for prostitution, while almost half of the prostitutes arrested in Las 
Vegas were 23 years old or younger.96 There are a multitude of documented reasons for youth 
entering the sex trade in Las Vegas.  
Some sex trade participants entered willingly, others were recruited by their friends or 
family, while some homeless youth traded sex in order to survive on the street.97 Survival sex 
is a common problem among homeless youth in Las Vegas, and as of 2018, Nevada had the 
highest homeless youth rate in the nation with more than 80% of its 1,400 homeless youth 
lacking adequate shelter.98 Furthermore, runaways or children within the Department of 
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Child and Family Services (DCFS) system, are at a higher risk of being victimized. According 
to the 2014 LVMPD and ASU STIR study, 55% of apprehended runaway youth in Las Vegas’ 
sex market did not have a missing person’s report filed on them by their foster or group 
homes.99 Consequently, this younger vulnerable prey is an easy target for suppliers to exploit. 
3. Suppliers 
Traffickers can take many forms, such as pimps, legitimate businessmen, corrections 
officers, teachers, family members, and friends.100 Not all pimps are technically considered 
traffickers under the TVPA. For example, prostitutes routinely pay pimps for protection or to 
find clientele, otherwise the prostitute operates independently without pimp coercion.101 
However, the majority of the sex trafficking cases in the U.S. occur within small groups or 
individual traffickers, usually manifesting as pimps, family members, and friends.102 In some 
cases, the trafficker will only act as the supplier, and sell the victim to a retailer for further 
exploitation. However, in the U.S., the trafficker commonly acts as the supplier and the 
retailer, repeatedly profiting from sales of the victim.  
While some trafficking cases do not involve traditional pimp figures, the majority of 
traffickers in the U.S. are pimps.103 Pimps target marginalized people because they have 
vulnerabilities that make them more susceptible to a pimp’s coercion and control mechanisms. 
Victim characteristics that pimps commonly seek are low self-esteem, insecurity, the need to 
belong, over dependence on others, lack of love or support networks, and products of broken 
homes where physical or sexual abuse has occurred.104 Sexually violent homes are “virtual 
training grounds” for commercial sex exploitation, as a victim with a predisposition to sexual 
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abuse is easier to prepare for the sex trade.105 Pimps use various tactics to recruit, control, 
and exploit victims. There are two commonly accepted typologies of pimps in HT literature: 
the “Gorilla” pimp, and the “Romeo” pimp. 
“Gorilla” pimps utilize the spectrum of violence to control and manipulate their 
victims. They methodically apply physical, sexual, and emotional abuse to create a sense of 
isolation, dependence, and sometimes emotional attachment in their victims.106 Although 
“Gorillas” are less common than “Romeo” pimps, they are the most sensationalized in the 
media and the most stereotyped. The Polaris Project reported that “Gorillas” only make up 
about 7% of traffickers, yet many media reports, books, and movies portray pimps holding 
victims at gunpoint, cultivating drug dependency, and threatening family members to force 
victims into the sex trade.107 However, the overwhelming majority of pimps use more subtle 
emotional dependence to lure victims into the commercial sex trade.  
“Romeo” pimps or “lover boys,” prey on a victim’s need to belong, a starvation for 
love, and the desire for physical and financial security.108 By creating the façade of an 
endearing relationship, these pimps build trust and foster emotional dependency, eventually 
conditioning the victims through a cycle of “intimacy and violence,” until they accept their 
role in the industry.109 “Romeos” are skilled at the art of manipulation and will imitate a 
boyfriend, father-figure, lover, or various other roles based on the emotional requirements of 
the victim (see Figure 2 for a full description of power and control tactics used by pimps).110 
In some cases, pimps are so effective at manipulation, they can successfully use previous 
victims to work for them as recruiters and managers.  
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A growing trend in the U.S., is the role of a victim in recruiting and management of 
other victims. This position is known as the “bottom.” The Polaris Project found that 30% of 
trafficking cases involved the use of a female victim to recruit and manipulate other 
victims.111 The “bottom” is usually the most tenured victim, with knowledge of her pimp’s 
trafficking operation. Although it appears to outsiders that the “bottom” is willingly 
perpetrating these crimes, she is usually using her role as a “protection strategy” against future 
violence.112 “Bottoms” are another product of the intense physical and psychological 
violence and manipulation that occurs within the sex trade. 
 
Figure 2. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Power and Control Wheel113 
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4. Suppliers in Las Vegas 
Like their victims, most traffickers in Las Vegas are residents of Nevada. 
According to one study, about 70% of the traffickers arrested in 2014, were from 
Nevada.114 Other demographics of Las Vegas traffickers follow national trends, in that 
they are mostly male and African American. LVMPD arrest data between 2014 and 2017, 
and the 2014 Las Vegas Sex Trafficking Case Study, indicate that traffickers in Las Vegas 
are about 85% male and just under two-thirds African American.115 Also similar to 
national trends, the majority of pimps in Las Vegas utilized “Romeo” tactics to recruit and 
manipulate their victims. In 2014, Lieutenant Spencer of the LVMPD, reported that 96% 
of traffickers used romantic relationships to build emotional dependency in their underage 
victims.116 There are also indications that traffickers may be transitioning into trafficking 
from other criminal careers. The same Las Vegas Sex Trafficking Case Study, claimed that 
80% of the traffickers arrested, also had previous criminal records, mostly consisting of 
violent crimes.117 Traffickers in Las Vegas are also highly reliant on wholesalers/retailers 
to advertise and move their human commodities. 
5. Wholesalers/Retailers 
Traffickers often operate as individuals, taking on the role of every link in the 
supply chain between the product and the consumer. However, some traffickers use 
wholesalers/retailers to market their product within the sex industry. For example, 
Wholesalers/Retailers may take on the role of cab or rideshare drivers that shuttle victims 
or consumers to their transactions, while conducting an extortion operation to maximize 
capital compensation from traffickers by making destination recommendations to 
customers.118 Traffickers may also market their victims through advertising. 
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Advertisements are a critical component of the retail process. Traffickers and 
retailers use various media to advertise their victims as commodities including newspapers, 
phonebooks, false job listings, and the internet. The internet has allowed traditional, more 
conspicuous forms of advertisement like street prostitution, to become less visible. The 
internet offers more anonymity, national and international reach for recruiting, 
exploitation, and sales, as well as rapid transactions. Until 2018, internet based classified 
personal websites like Craigslist.com and Backpage.com were favorites of traffickers. As 
of 2008, traffickers in the Washington, D.C., area advertised about 200 trafficking victims 
a day on Craigslist.119 However, by 2012, law enforcement’s efforts to monitor the Adult 
Services section of the site, forced most of its illicit activity to migrate to Backpage. 
Backpage subsequently supplanted Craigslist as the top venue for internet based sales of 
sex, accounting for about 70% of all web based sex advertisement, and earning $22 million 
per year in the process.120 Additionally, as of 2015, Backpage accounted for 71% of all 
minor trafficking advertisements, and reported more than 400 ads of potential minors every 
month.121  
In response to the increase in internet advertisements of sex, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA) and the Allow States and Victims 
to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) in April 2018. As a result, the entire 
Backpage website was closed. Although these efforts may remove the most popular venues 
for trafficking sales, it is not likely to permanently disrupt market operations. Many believe 
that the market will follow the displacement theory and simply migrate to other, more 
inconspicuous advertising venues. As one San Diego law enforcement official claimed, 
“Backpage required little resources and manpower, and closing these surveillance 
resources would force illicit activity further underground, and if it went completely 
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underground, it may be impossible to find.”122 Traffickers’ efforts to diversify advertising, 
not only allows them to avoid law enforcement detection, but also to reach a broader pool 
of consumers. 
6. Wholesalers/Retailers in Las Vegas 
Before 2015, taxis dominated the wholesale/retail link in Las Vegas’ supply chain. 
In 2007, it is estimated that Las Vegas cab drivers were receiving $50 million in kickbacks 
for referring riders to various sex industry venues.123 Currently, rideshare drivers play a 
more prominent role in the Wholesaler/Retailer link. One source claims that rideshare 
drivers can make between $50-700 a week in kickbacks.124 There is even a web based 
application to inform drivers of the closest venues with the highest kickbacks, known as 
the Vegas Kickbacks app. Although it is technically illegal for any driver to divert the rider 
to an alternate location without their approval, there is nothing illegal about recommending 
intermediate stops along the way, including venues that promote sex trafficking. The sex 
market not only pays for referrals but also for advertisements. 
While street prostitution still exists in Las Vegas, print advertisements and the 
internet are allowing more inconspicuous marketing of prostitutes and victims. As of 2007, 
more than $26 million was being spent to advertise sex, the majority of which consisted of 
print based ads in the newspaper, catalogs, escort cards, and more than 170 pages in the 
phonebook yellow pages.125 Furthermore, “the yellow pages boast of college girls, student 
nurses, exotic beauties, barely legal wild teens, Russian and Asian teen petites; most 
advertisements claim to provide ‘full service,’ indicating intercourse is available.”126 
Today, most sex advertisement is internet based. A 2018 study conducted by the Human 
Trafficking Initiative, a Creighton University think-tank, dedicated to informing criminal 
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policy regarding sex trafficking, investigated 435 pages of Backpage sex advertisements 
within Nevada. It concluded that there are more than 5,000 individuals sold for sex online 
in Nevada every month, with more than 171 “unique sex providers” every month, for every 
100,000 people.127 Furthermore, Nevada had 63% more web based sex advertisements 
than any other state in the U.S., and about 500 ads per month may involve trafficking 
victims.128 The wholesale/retail process, especially advertising, is reinforcing demand 
within the commercial sex market. 
7. Consumers 
The consumers of sex, also known as buyers or johns, constitute the demand side 
of the sex market. Buyers are among the most diverse demographic within the supply chain. 
However, most studies investigating the demand side of the sex market found that the 
majority of buyers were white, middle-aged men in the middle to upper-class.129 Over the 
last 20 years, there is consistent evidence that about 15% of American males have 
purchased sex at some point in their lives, while 1% have done so within the last year.130  
8. Consumers in Las Vegas 
There is very limited data on clients of prostitution in Las Vegas. However, demand 
is significant and driven by both locals and tourists. Much like the U.S. trend, buyers are 
predominantly Caucasian males. Of the 90 total arrests for purchasing sex recorded by the 
LVMPD between the years 2014–2017, almost 80% were Caucasian men.131 Additionally, 
with more than 40 million visitors per year, the demand in Las Vegas is perennially fueled 
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by tourism. The proportion of local demand and tourist demand will be further discussed 
in Chapter III. Although the market may be driven by demand, current U.S. and Nevada 
law enforcement practices are failing to prosecute buyers. 
D. LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY
1. Criminalization of Prostitution in the United States
In all prostitution exchanges, there are at least two parties involved. Furthermore, 
in trafficking cases, another party is involved. Yet, there are a disproportionate amount of 
convictions solely against the victims. In 2008, there were only 77 convictions of 
traffickers in the entire country.132 Within the last ten years, there has been a more 
concerted effort to convict traffickers, but the statistics are still pretty bleak. In 2015, there 
were 5,544 reported cases of sex trafficking and the Department of Justice only sentenced 
759 traffickers.133 With a 13% conviction rate, traffickers perceive very little risk of arrest 
and even less risk of prosecution. Currently, the benefits of trafficking humans far outweigh 
the costs and risks associated with the crime. Many traffickers have claimed that they 
transitioned from other illicit activities like trafficking drugs and guns because there was 
less risk for incarceration in HT.134 In fact, with law enforcement’s current emphasis on 
reducing Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking (DMST), some traffickers are only selling adults 
to avoid detection. As one pimp stated in an Urban Institute study, “[he has] never known 
a pimp that got in trouble for messing with adults.”135 The prosecution rate of pimps and 
traffickers is poor because many victims are afraid to testify, and it is difficult to find direct 
evidence implicating traffickers without victim cooperation. It is also more difficult to 
identify and prosecute those who pay for sex.  
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According to Time, in 2010, 43,000 prostitutes were arrested nation-wide, while 
only 19,000 males were arrested.136 Furthermore, the males arrested accounted for buyers, 
pimps, and male prostitutes combined.137 Traditionally, only about 10% of those arrested 
in sexual transactions are buyers.138 Furthermore, with the underground nature of the sex 
market and the low rates of prosecution and conviction, some estimates place the likelihood 
of a buyer arrest near the 0.001% mark.139 With fewer deterrence measures aimed at 
buyers than those directed toward suppliers, it is not surprising that demand within the sex 
market is high. 
2. Criminalization of Prostitution in Las Vegas
Trends that affect enforcement of prostitution laws throughout the U.S. also affect 
LVMPD and other Nevada agencies. For example, Nevada puts a disproportionate 
emphasis on arresting prostitutes over their clients. According to the Nevada Uniform 
Crime Report, almost 14,000 prostitutes were arrested between the years 2014–2017, while 
only 1% of the buyers in those transactions suffered the same fate.140 With such as small 
reduction in total demand, it is likely that buyers are not deterred by law enforcement’s 
efforts.  
Another Las Vegas law enforcement practice that may be causing problems is the 
continued detention of underage prostitutes. According to the TVPA, all prostitutes under 
the age of 18 are considered victims, but the state still treats them as criminals. “Girls who 
disclose child sexual exploitation are being pulled deeper into the juvenile justice system” 
rather than being rescued from it.141 The combination of these issues makes victims less 
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trusting of law enforcement and less cooperative during trafficking investigations, 
culminating in fewer human trafficking convictions. In 2014, almost 75% of the cases 
against traffickers were never filed, and of the 40 that were filed, 22 perpetrators received 
plea bargains, while only 12 received prison sentences.142 Low conviction rates create a 
lack of deterrent credibility. Thus, traffickers in the Las Vegas sex industry likely feel the 
benefits of the crime outweigh the costs. Until this paradigm shifts, Las Vegas will still be 
marred with victims of sexual exploitation. The rest of this study will investigate how 
policy changes could disrupt Las Vegas’ underground commercial sex industry. By using 
a System Dynamics model to represent the industry, policy changes can be simulated to 
better understand how they affect a complex system of systems over time.  
  
                                               
142 Spencer et al., 2014 Las Vegas Sex Trafficking Case Study 7. 
30 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
31 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the methodology that was used to investigate the effects of 
various policy changes on the commercial sex market in Las Vegas. Overall, a qualitative 
approach to exploratory analysis, informed by System Dynamics modeling, was 
conducted. It is important to note that this study was not conducted to provide statistical 
analysis or hypothesis testing, but rather, qualitative exploration of system feedback loops 
and other interactions within the sex market system of systems. 
A. USING SYSTEM DYNAMICS AS A METHODOLOGY 
A system is a group of interconnected components, organized to achieve a goal.143 
Many complex systems are comprised of systems within systems. Thus, decision making 
regarding complex human-based systems increases in difficulty as the number of 
interacting systems and feedback mechanisms grow. As Sterman points out, “most of the 
changes we now struggle to comprehend arise as a consequence … of humanity itself.”144 
Furthermore, bounded rationality exacerbates poor decision making within these complex 
systems. Bounded rationality refers to an individual’s ability to make decisions based on 
the information that is available, which is limited by one’s knowledge, cognitive 
capabilities, and time.145 Humans tend to think linearly, based on recent events that follow 
a logical order, but the world exists in multidirectional, simultaneously occurring nonlinear 
systems.146 Finally, assumptions used to make decisions are usually based upon mental 
models or heuristics. As Tversky and Kahneman point out, “people rely on a limited 
number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities 
and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.”147 These heuristic principles are 
                                               
143 Donna Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer, ed. Dianna Wright (White River Junction, VT: 
Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 2008), 11. 
144 John Sterman, Business Dynamics (New York: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2010), 3, 21. 
145 Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 106; Sterman, Business Dynamics, 598. 
146 Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 5; Sterman, Business Dynamics, 10. 
147 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” 
Science 185 no. 4157 (1974), 1124, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1738360.pdf. 
32 
based on “data of limited validity,” which can lead to “severe and systematic errors” and 
often fail to compensate for real world nonlinearities.148 Therefore, System Dynamics 
(SD) modeling is meant to increase decision makers’ awareness of non-linear feedback at 
play within a system’s structure that is generating problematic behavioral outcomes. 
SD modeling allows decision makers to open their aperture to additional 
information within the system that they may not have otherwise perceived. Modeling and 
simulation can assist in the analysis of a systems structure and behavior as well as providing 
the means to explore policy options and conditions that could affect behavioral outcomes 
over time.149 In general, “systems thinking is a learning process, in which we replace a 
rudimentist, narrow, short-run, static view of the world with a holistic, broad, long-term, 
dynamic view, and then redesign our policies and institutions accordingly.”150 The 
application of systems thinking and the use of SD modeling may reduce the tendency to 
make event-based decisions limited by bounded rationality that could have unintended long 
term consequences.  
When investigating policy options for a system that is illicit and underground, SD 
modeling and simulation becomes even more helpful. To avoid the pitfalls of bounded 
rationality, it is imperative to acquire as much information about the system as possible, 
and then to model how the system operates. However, gathering precise quantitative data 
on an underground market is nearly impossible. Fortunately, SD modeling is not solely 
reliant on quantitative data; system dynamics modeling also makes use of qualitative data, 
estimates, and assumptions based on subject matter expert insights. Rather than predicting 
specific or precise quantitative outcomes, the value of system dynamics modeling is the 
insight it provides into the effect of the system’s structure on its behavior. As Porter opines, 
                                               
148 Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgement Under Uncertainty,” 1124; Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 
87. 
149 Norman Wayne Porter, “The Value of System Dynamics Modeling in Policy Analytics and 
Planning,” In Policy Analytics, Modelling, and Informatics, ed. by J. Ramon Gil-Garcia, Theresea Pardo, 
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150 Sterman, Business Dynamics, 18. 
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more important than estimates, is offering decision makers with greater grasp of causal 
relationships, nonlinear behavioral trends, and other relationships within the system.151  
Modeling and simulation allow policy makers to explore a multitude of alternatives 
prior to affecting change. The modeling of possible worst-case scenarios can help reduce 
risk by facilitating the development of hedging strategies.152 The sex trafficking market is 
a perfect example of a high-risk policy environment for decision makers. Due to the high 
cost to implement policies without assurance of their effectiveness, real world 
experimentation is unfeasible. Therefore, SD experimentation would be a more tenable 
option to evaluate policy changes prior to implementation.153 Policy options within other 
illicit markets have been explored using modeling. For instance, a 2008 study used agent-
based modeling to explore law enforcement policy effectiveness against street-level 
heroine distribution in Melbourne, Australia. The study found that incorporating a policy 
of police and community outreach coordination significantly reduced the number of heroin 
users.154 SD modeling has similarly been used to explore counterterrorism policy options. 
Pruyt and Kwakkel used a multi-model approach, partly consisting of SD to model 
radicalization and extremism leading to terrorism. They found, counterintuitively, that by 
leveraging problem symptoms and activists, it is possible to raise awareness of the issues 
that may be causing grievances within homegrown radical and extremist groups.155 
Furthermore, political systems that allow the airing of extremist’s grievances, decrease the 
                                               
151 Porter, “The Value of System Dynamics,” 126. 
152 Steve Bankes, “Exploratory Modeling for Policy Analysis,” Operations Research 41, no. 3 (1993), 
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perception of marginalization and quell radical activism.156 Pruyt and Kwakkel conclude 
that these findings would not have been possible without SD modeling. In another study, 
Kovari and Pruyt used SD to model the Dutch commercial sex market in order to evaluate 
the possible effectiveness of various mitigation policies. They concluded that criminalizing 
prostitution would likely drive most of the market underground and feed criminal 
organizations, whereas addressing demand alone, would be insufficient to address 
trafficking and organized crime.157 This study builds off of Kovari and Pruyt’s findings 
within the boundaries of Las Vegas, Nevada. 
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
According to Bankes, an exploratory methodology is the preferred approach when
critical information is unavailable.158 Due to the nontransparent nature of the underground 
commercial sex market, SD modeling was used to support an exploratory approach in this 
study. With the complexity of this system, the scope of the study is constrained, or 
bounded, to minimize the convolution of its corresponding model. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this study, the Las Vegas commercial sex market is geographically bounded 
within the confines of its metropolitan area. Quantitative data was incorporated to build the 
Base Model representing the system, and a qualitative approach was used, based on 
research conducted on similar policies, to determine policy effects on the system. 
Quantitative population data was taken from the U.S. Census Bureau, Federal Reserve 
Economic Data, Southern Nevada Health District records, and the Las Vegas Convention 
and Visitors Authority’s tourism statistics. Furthermore, quantitative crime data was 
derived from the LVMPD arrest records in the Nevada Uniform Crime Report (2014-
2017), as well as the “2014 Las Vegas Sex Trafficking Case-Study” conducted by the 
LVMPD in conjunction with ASU STIR. Once the Base Model was built, variables 
(converters) were incorporated into the model for every policy, according to how each 
policy would alter the system. Each policy and its respective changes to the Base Model 
156 Kovari and Kwakkel, “Radicalization Under Deep Uncertainty,” 23. 
157 Kovari and Pruyt, “A Model-Based Exploration,” 54. 
158 Bankes, “Exploratory Modeling,” 436. 
35 
are discussed in Chapter IV. All the changes were incorporated into the Base Model 
individually to determine their behavioral outcomes. Then, a combination of policy 
changes were explored to determine if incorporating prostitution and service policies 
together, yielded the best results. Finally, the initial stocks of the Base Model were 
increased to their researched maximum estimated values to explore the uncertainty of the 
illicit market status quo and the effects of the policies under “worst-case” conditions. 
Exploring uncertainty of the initial stock values is further discussed in Chapter V.  
C. CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Like any other economic market, the commercial sex market is a system that is
driven by supply and demand. Thus, the major sectors of the market consist of the 
population of suppliers and buyers of sex. A Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) can be used to 
develop the basic feedback loops, based on the mental model of the market. CLDs “are 
simply maps showing the causal links among variables with arrows from a cause to an 
effect” and “emphasizes the feedback structure of a system.”159 Within the CLD, “each 
causal link is assigned a polarity to indicate how the dependent variable changes when the 
independent variable changes.”160 Figure 3 is the Las Vegas Commercial Sex Market 
Causal Loop Diagram. On the right side of the diagram, Nevada’s Legal Sex Economy’s 
influence on the illegal market is depicted. As discussed in Chapter II, even though the 
legal market does not exist within Clark County, legal systems within neighboring counties 
increase tourism and illegal sex transactions within the city. According to Macfarlane et 
al., as of 2009, the legal brothel system in Nevada served almost half a million customers 
per year.161 Thus, an assumption made for this study, is that some portion of the sex 
tourism created by the legal system is bleeding over into Las Vegas. Within the CLD, the 
Legal Sex Economy’s behavior is reinforcing. Therefore, as the number of legal sex 
consumers grows, sex advertising and sex tourism also increase.  
159 Sterman, Business Dynamics, 102. 
160 Sterman, Business Dynamics, 138. 
161 Macfarlane et al., “Sex Industry and Sex Workers in Nevada,” 12. 
36 
With legal and illegal systems in such proximity, there is an unavoidable overlap. 
Wholesalers and retailers are crucial in connecting the markets between legal and illegal 
systems. For example, as Farley points out, as of 2007, about 85% of transactions that 
occurred in Las Vegas were facilitated by cab drivers.162 Therefore, as tourism increases, 
the opportunity for cab and ride-share drivers to make extra money also increases, 
reinforcing the illegal demand component of the system. Additionally, as tourism and 
advertising increases, social acceptance of the sex market rises as well. More acceptance 
within the Las Vegas population blurs the line between the legal and illegal sex industry, 
subsequently increasing supply and demand.  
The Illegal Sex Economy Loop in the CLD is balancing, seeking an equilibrium 
relative to supply and demand. As demand increases, the number of traffickers increases, 
thereby increasing the number of victims within the system. However, the loop is balanced 
by the effect of price on demand. Assuming that demand is elastic, or has an inverse 
relationship with price, an increase in price will drive demand down and vice versa. 
Additionally, price has a direct influence on profits within the system. Assuming costs 
remain constant, as price escalates, so do the profits. A more profitable market will also 
attract more prostitutes and traffickers. However, once there is a surplus of supply, the 
price and profits will again decrease. This follows the law of supply and demand in that 
the availability of a commodity, or supply, is the driving factor for market price and overall 
demand.163 Through this goal seeking behavior, the system will find an equilibrium 
between price and profit relative to supply and demand. Another balancing loop within the 
system is the result of Law Enforcement. 
162 Farley, Prostitution and Trafficking in Nevada, 132. 
163 Joseph Whelan, Kamil Msefer, and Celeste V. Chung, Economic Supply & Demand (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT, 2001), 12. 
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Figure 3. Las Vegas Commercial Sex Market Causal Loop Diagram164 
As the Illegal Sex Economy grows, more pressure is placed on local law enforcement 
to suppress it. Unfortunately, current law enforcement practices have created an environment 
that is counterproductive. For example, the criminalization policy regarding prostitution and 
the disproportionate arrests of prostitutes relative to buyers, has created distrust between 
prostitutes and law enforcement. Therefore, the deterrence expectation of the criminalization 
policy is not effective because buyers do not have a credible assurance of punishment if 
caught. This distrust is also leading to a lack of trafficking convictions, which keeps the 
benefits higher than the costs for would-be traffickers entering the market. 
As prostitutes and victims continue to suffer the brunt of law enforcement’s efforts, 
cultural aspects of the Las Vegas community are affected. This is depicted by the Culture 
164 Figure 3 depicts the CLD of Las Vegas’ commercial sex market derived from the qualitative 
analysis of sources presented in Chapter II as well as footnotes 161–163. 
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Loop of the CLD. For example, increasingly disproportionate arrests of prostitutes signals to 
victims and the public that females have a lower relative value than men.165 As gender 
inequality increases, so does the social acceptance and willingness to provide and purchase 
commercial sex. This is especially true for individuals that were raised in households where 
familial prostitution or pimping have occurred.166 Ultimately, these cultural implications 
further blur the distinction between the legal and illegal aspects of the market and increase 
supply and demand. Although the CLD can be used to comprehend feedback within the 
system, the stock and flow diagram provides a better understanding of the system’s physical 
characteristics and the movement of materials within it.  
D. THE SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL
As Sterman points out, “stock and flow diagrams highlight the physical structure of a
system and tracks the accumulations of materials, money, and information as they travel 
within that system.”167 Furthermore, “stocks are accumulations and capture a state of a 
system,” whereas a flow represents the rate of change of a stock.168 The Base System 
Dynamics Model consists of three sectors: Population, Supply, and Demand (reference Figure 
4 for a depiction of the Base Model Stock and Flow Diagram).  
1. Population Sector
Within the Population Sector there are two stocks, consisting of children and adults. 
As we can see in Figure 4, the Population Sector is constructed as a simple aging chain. The 
inflow rate of children into the population is affected by a constant 5.4% Birth Rate converter. 
The outflow rate of children becoming adults, labeled Maturation, is restricted by a time delay 
of eighteen years. The initial stock values of Children (77,000) and Adults (400,000) were 
165 Sheila Jeffreys, The Idea of Prostitution (Victoria, AU: Spinifex Press, 2008), 184, 195; Busch-
Armendariz, Nsonwu, and Cook Heffron, Human Trafficking, 221, 256–57. 
166 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 123. 
167 Sterman, Business Dynamics, 102. 
168 Sterman, Business Dynamics, 192, 204. 
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obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.169 Additionally, a Net Migration Flow converter is 
used with a constant inflow of 30,000 people per year, based on trend information obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Economic Data.170 People can only exit the population chain via 
the Deaths outflow in conjunction with the Death Rate converter which is held constant in the 
model at 3%.171  
Several major assumptions were used in the population stocks and flow rates. First, as 
previously mentioned, the initial stocks are bounded within the Las Vegas metropolitan area 
only. Next, Birth Rate, Death Rate, and Net Migration Flow are held constant. Another 
assumption is that the population flow into the Supply Sector is entirely comprised of women 
and children, while only men flow into the Demand Sector. Obviously, this is not entirely 
indicative of the true sex market, since women can be buyers and men can be victims or 
prostitutes. However, based on recent Las Vegas studies, females still constitute the vast 
majority of the supply chain.172 Also, although there are willing child prostitution participants 
in the sex market, the model assumes that anyone under the age of eighteen will automatically 
flow into the Supply of Victims stock. This assumption is in accordance with the TVPA, which 
considers all minors to be victims. 
                                               
169 American Census Bureau, American Fact Finder, accessed April 2019, https://factfinder.census.gov/
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170  Federal Reserve Economic Data, “Net Migration Flow for Clark County, NV,” accessed May 2019, 
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Figure 4. Las Vegas Commercial Sex Market Stock and Flow Diagram 
Population Sector173 
2. Supply Sector 
Children can leave the Population Sector and enter the Supply of Victims stock in the 
Supply Sector, while adults leaving can enter via the Supply of Prostitutes or Victims stocks 
(see Figure 5). The rate of inflow into both supply stocks is dependent on the profitability of 
the market. Converters labeled Prostitution Profit Effect and Trafficking Profit Effect are used 
in conjunction with the Profit Per Participant converter to determine whether the rate of 
inflow for each stock will increase or decrease. Referencing the graphical converter of the 
Prostitution Profit Effect in Figure 6, we can begin to see some of the assumptions made about 
profitability relative to the attractiveness of the market for willing prostitutes.  
                                               
173 Figure 4 shows the Population Sector of the Las Vegas Base Model derived from qualitative analysis 
of the system interrelationships from sources found in Chapter II and footnotes 169–172. 
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Figure 5. Las Vegas Commercial Sex Market Supply Sector Stock and Flow 
Diagram174 
First, along the x-axis, the boundaries of Profits Per Participant converter range 
from $5,000 to $50,000. The tipping point between an increase or decrease in prostitution 
is assumed to be the poverty level ($25,000/year). If the profit margins exceed the poverty 
level, it is assumed that prostitution rates will increase gradually until profits reach 
$50,000, at which point they will double every year. As profits diminish below the poverty 
line, prostitution rates gradually diminish until they reach $5,000, at which point they will 
decrease by 50%. Note that it is possible for prostitutes within the market to exceed both 
defined profit boundaries, but the intent of the model is to identify trends based on 
increasing or decreasing profits. Thus, the profit boundaries are sufficient to understand 
the relationship between profit and supply. The Supply of Victims stock has a similar 
graphical converter to affect rate of inflow of victims. 
                                               
174 Figure 5 depicts the Supply Sector of the Las Vegas Base Model and was derived from sources listed 
in Chapter II and footnotes 176–177. 
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Figure 6. Effect of Profit Per Participant on Inflow Rate of Prostitution175 
It is assumed that as the profitability of the market increases, more traffickers will be 
incentivized to enter, thus increasing the rate of inflow of victims. In Figure 7, we can see that 
the Profit Per Participant boundaries use the same assumptions and caveats. However, the 
growth rate is modeled to be more aggressive as the profits in the market grow, while the rates 
of decline are more resilient to change within the market. Therefore, as profits increase above 
the tipping point, the maximum inflow rate is 2% greater than that of prostitution. Assuming 
traffickers are rational actors, they will be more likely to enter the market while it is more 
lucrative. There is resilience built into the converter because there is also a smaller decrease 
in inflow, relative to prostitution, as the profits drop below the tipping point. This assumes 
that traffickers can compensate for less profit per victim, by increasing the number of victims, 
                                               
175 Figure 6 shows the inflow rate of prostitutes into the sex market based on profits relative to the 
poverty line. This is a subjective assumption based on prostitutes being rational actors and only desiring to 
remain in an illegal market if profits create enough incentive.  
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or forcing them to serve more buyers. The initial stock values in the Supply Sector are based 
on various estimates throughout the literature regarding Las Vegas’ commercial sex market. 
There are estimates for the Supply of Prostitutes stock that range from 3,5000 to 30,000.176 
In order to test the Base Model with a moderate value, the Supply of Prostitutes stock is 
initialized at 11,000. Trafficking victim estimates are equally uncertain, ranging from several 
hundred to almost 6,000.177 An initial value of 5,000 victims was used for the Supply of 
Victims stock in the Base Model. These values are summed for an initial supply of 16,000 in 
the Total Sex Market Supply converter.  
 
Figure 7. Effect of Profit Per Participant on Inflow Rate of Victims178 
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Once part of the Supply Sector, victims can exit the Supply of Victims stock via a 
Rescued outflow. Two converters contribute to the rate of outflow. First, the Law 
Enforcement Effectiveness Against Trafficking assumes a constant 15% rate of outflow, 
based on law enforcement’s current effectiveness in combating trafficking.179 
Additionally, the Avg Time as Victim converter provides a constant seven-year window in 
which victims remain within the stock. Once seven years within the stock is surpassed, the 
victims are assumed to no longer be a desirable commodity by the Demand Sector, and 
“age out” of the system.180 Similarly, prostitutes can exit the Supply of Prostitutes stock 
via the Exiting Prostitution outflow. The Law Enforcement Effect on Prostitution and Avg 
Time as Participant converters determine the rate of outflow from the stock. The Law 
Enforcement Effect on Prostitution converter is a constant reduction of prostitutes by 15% 
per year. This figure is based on the 2014–2017 LVMPD arrests of prostitutes relative to 
the Base Model Supply of Prostitutes initial stock value estimate.181 The Avg Time as a 
Participant converter is also a constant of twelve years.182 The two supply stocks are 
connected via the Total Sex Market Supply converter which also connects the Supply Sector 
to the Demand Sector.  
3. Demand Sector 
The Total Demand stock is being fed by Local and Tourism Demand inflows as 
depicted in Figure 8. Local Demand is a byproduct of the Adult population stock from the 
Population Sector and is assumed to be fed by sexually active (between the ages 18–65) 
males only. Tourism Demand is a function of the Tourists Per Year stock. This stock has a 
constant 1.8% annual increase via the % Increase in Tourism Annually converter to 
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represent the current rate of tourism growth per year.183 Both demand inflows are affected 
by constant Rate of Demand converters and Price Effect converters that increase or 
decrease flow rates based on the current market price of a sexual service. The Rate of Local 
Demand is based on multiple studies concluding that 1% of the U.S. population has 
purchased sex within the last year.184 The Rate of Tourism Demand converter is a much 
smaller percentage (0.04%), based on assumption of several demographic criteria taken 
from the LVCVA. First, of the 42 million tourists that visited Las Vegas in 2017, 50% were 
male. Next, 81% of those males were below an assumed maximum sexually active age of 
65, and 94% were employed. Of the remaining men, 81% had sufficient disposable income 
(assumed to be greater than $40,000 per year) for the purchase of sex.185 Finally, of the 
men that were sexually active with the money to purchase sex, only 1% were likely to 
participate in the market.186 This equates to 0.04% of the original 42 million visitors. Both 
Rate of Demand converters were held constant and combined to find the initial value for 
the Total Demand stock of 19,000. As profits affect the rate of inflow for supply, price 
affects the rate of inflow for demand. 
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Figure 8. Las Vegas Commercial Sex Market Demand Sector Stock and 
Flow Diagram187 
An elastic demand effect is modeled via the Price Effect on Local and Tourism 
Demand converters. The boundaries of price are intended to show trend information 
relative to price fluctuations and are not intended to model exact prices and consumer 
attitude toward fluctuations. Since the Initial Price within the model is $200, both demand 
converters produce the inflow status quo if the price remains around $200. As the price 
decreases toward $50, demand rates grow. Contrarily, as price doubles past $400, inflow 
rates decrease. The price is adjusted by the Initial Price converter via the Annual Price 
Adjustment converter. The price adjustment is dependent on the ratio of supply and 
                                               
187 Figure 8 shows the Demand Sector of the Las Vegas Base Model based on qualitative analysis 
from sources listed in Chapter II and footnotes 183–186. 
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demand. If the ratio remains close to one, the price remains constant. However, as the ratio 
exceeds one, the price will decrease, and the opposite is true as the ratio drops below one 
(see Figure 9 for a graphical depiction of price adjustment). Furthermore, the Annual Price 
Adjustment has a delay of three months, causing a slight lag in Price and profit relative to 
changes in supply and demand. By multiplying price by demand, and then subtracting the 
Annual Cost converter, one can find the Annual Profit of the market. The Annual Cost is 
assumed to be a constant of $15/buyer, accounting for the purchase of hotels, clothing, 
perfume, transportation, or prophylactics. Note, that the annual cost converter does not 
incorporate intangible costs, such as fear of arrest or physical abuse from buyers.  
Thus far, the model assumes that each buyer only purchases sex once per year, 
limiting the total clients per supply participant. Therefore, the Avg Number of Clients 
converter was added to account for this unrealistic aspect of the model. It is assumed that 
each supply participant provides 84 services per year, or seven per month.188 Finally, by 
dividing the Annual Profits by the total number of supply participants, we can find the 
Profit Per Participant, which feeds the inflow rate of prostitutes and victims in the Supply 
Sector. A full list of model equations can be found in the Appendix. 
The dynamics between the delay in price and the profit effects cause goal seeking 
behavior between the stocks as the system searches for an equilibrium between price and 
profits relative to supply and demand. Once men enter the Total Demand stock, the 
outflows are limited. 
                                               
188 Kovari and Pruyt, “A Model-Based Exploration,” 40, this is a conservative estimate based on 
Kovari and Pruyt’s study, which estimated that prostitutes in the Dutch commercial sex market had 30 
customers and performed 24 services per person, per year. 
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Figure 9. Graphical Depiction of Annual Price Adjustment Converter189 
The Incarcerated outflow in conjunction with the Law Enforcement Effect on 
Demand converter is the only way buyers can leave the Total Demand stock. This outflow 
accounts for the number of buyers that are arrested and removed from the market. The Law 
Enforcement Effect on Demand converter is a constant of 1%, based on a comparison of 
the number of prostitutes arrested relative to the arrests of the associated buyers in those 
sexual transactions between the years of 2014–2017.190  
When all the sectors are combined, they are a representation of Las Vegas’ sex 
market interactions and feedbacks. In Figure 10, the entire model composed of all three 
sectors is presented.  
                                               
189 Figure 9 is a qualitative interpretation of a possible price adjustment based on sources in Chapter 
II and Wagner, Whitmer, and Spivak, Experiences of Youth, 3. 
190 Wright, Butler, and Hall, Uniform Crime Reporting 2014 Report, 142; Wright et al., Uniform 
Crime Reporting 2015 Report, 182; Wright et al., Uniform Crime Reporting 2016 Report 333, 437; Wright 
et al., Uniform Crime Reporting 2017 Report 393–421. 
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Figure 10. Las Vegas Sex Market Base Model Stock and Flow Diagram 
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IV. POLICY DISCUSSION 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents background information on several sex market policy options 
that can be implemented in Las Vegas. After introducing the background regarding the 
policies, CLDs will be presented for each policy to determine system feedback 
characteristics of each. Finally, the changes that each policy would have on the structure 
of the Base Model’s stocks and flows are presented.  
B. POLICY OPTIONS 
Criminalizing the sex market is not having the desired deterrent effect. As Nichols 
points out, deterrence-based prostitution policy is unproductive, too naïve, and is the “most 
harmful for those who willingly engage in sexual commerce as well as sex trafficked 
people who are criminalized as sex workers.”191 Furthermore, Busch-Armendariz, 
Nsonwu, and Cook Heffron argue that the “ban on the sale of commercial sex is more 
rigorously enforced than the ban on the purchase of sex,” leading to increased opportunity 
for coercion due to fear of the criminal justice system.192 There are several alternative 
policy options that have been discussed or implemented in various sex markets around the 
world. Five policies are explored within this model. Three of the policies directly affect 
prostitution; Legalization, Abolition, and a Hybrid of the two. The other two policies are 
service oriented and labeled, Victim Advocacy and Resilience Education. 
1. Legalization 
Criminalization is the current prostitution policy in other than rural areas of Nevada. 
It criminalizes the sale of oneself, purchase of, or assisting the sale of another person for 
the purpose of sexual relations.193 However, in the majority of the counties in Nevada 
                                               
191 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 66, 77. 
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(with populations less than 700,000), prostitution within approved brothels is legal.194 The 
brothel system operates under specific regulations that include attaining licensure, only 
employing documented workers, and maintaining health standards.195 To attain 
documentation, sex workers must pay for “work cards” and receive regular testing for 
sexually transmitted infections (STIs).196 Commercial sex outside of the brothel system is 
considered illegal. This construct is similar to that of other legalized commercial sex 
industries, such as those in the Netherlands and Germany.  
Advocates argue that there are many benefits to legalization. First, some believe 
that the legal system reduces violence against prostitutes, thereby increasing the overall 
safety of sex workers.197 For example, in legal Nevada brothels, many of the rooms have 
panic buttons.198 In a recent study, 84% of prostitutes within Nevada’s legal system felt 
safer.199 In addition to increased safety, a legalized system may reduce health risks of 
prostitutes and buyers.  
With the legal system’s STI testing and mandatory condom use policy, Nevada 
claims that there have been zero reported Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) cases 
linked to brothels since 1987.200 A legal system could also reduce some of the criminal 
stigma associated with prostitution. In theory, since prostitutes would be more willing to 
assist police without the fear of arrest, some of the burden on law enforcement to find sex 
traffickers may be alleviated. Legal prostitution can also increase state revenues within the 
sex industry. Brothels and sex workers must apply for licensure and documentation that 
                                               
194 Nevada Counties: Government, NRS § 244.345(8) (2013), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-
244.html#NRS244Sec345. 
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could become Clark County revenue. According to MacFarlane et al., between 2017–2018, 
Nevada counties made over $860,000 on legal brothel license and work card fees 
alone.201These revenues could then be reinvested into vocational training, reform 
programs, and other social services to offer a way out of the market for those wanting to 
exit. Finally, prostitutes under a legal system can be afforded labor rights of other legal 
occupations, such as, a minimum wage, freedom from discrimination, a safe work 
environment, benefits, the possibility of unions, medical insurance, and pension plans.202 
The effects that legalization would have on the system’s feedback loops are shown in 
Figure 11.  
In the Legalization Policy CLD, the cause and effect relationships within this policy 
are displayed. Within the Legalization Loop, as the amount of legal sex workers increases, 
the total Regulation Taxes also increase. This creates more revenue for Prostitution Reform 
Programs, ultimately decreasing the number of willing Prostitutes. Furthermore, with less 
stigma attached to their profession, more prostitutes would be willing to increase 
Prostitution Cooperation with Law Enforcement, eventually leading to less Traffickers and 
Victims. Note, that the polarity of the Legalization Loop within the CLD is balancing. 
Therefore, the overall effect on the system will depend on the dominance of the feedback 
loop. The Base Model was modified to incorporate the changes that a Legalization Policy 
would have on the structure of the system.  
                                               
201 MacFarlane et al., “Sex Industry and Sex Workers in Nevada,”10. 
202 Metla, “Prostitution.” 
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Figure 11. Legalization Policy Causal Loop Diagram203 
Two main effects of the Legalization Policy were incorporated into the Base Model 
for exploration. As shown in Figure 12, a Work Card Tax converter, was incorporated and 
held constant at $150. The tax is multiplied by the Supply of Prostitutes in the market to 
find the Work Card Revenue generated per year. Once revenue is accumulated, it can begin 
to create social services, vocational schools, and diversion programs. It was assumed that 
each program would require $10 million to fund infrastructure, personnel, and other 
support aspects of these programs. Therefore, for every $10 million accrued, one reform 
program can be created. As programs are implemented, they are represented in the Total 
Reform Programs converter.  
                                               
203  Figure 11 depicts the causal relationships within the Las Vegas Base Model with a legalized 
prostitution policy based on qualitative analysis of sources listed in Chapter II and footnotes 191–202. 
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Figure 12. Legalization Policy Changes to Base Model Stock and Flow 
Diagram 204 
The next four converters contribute to a modeling construct like a Susceptible-
Infectious (SI) model. The Reform Contact Rate converter divided by the Yearly Reform 
Capacity represents the total prostitution population that is susceptible, or desire to exit the 
market due to reform programs. The Yearly Reform Capacity is a constant of 500 people 
per program created. Next, the Reform Contact Rate is multiplied by the % Wanting to 
Leave Industry to find the Reform Effectiveness. The % Wanting to Leave Industry is like 
the infection rate of an SI model of those that would leave if they underwent reform. This 
value is a constant of 50%, based on several studies that indicate similar rates in sex 
workers wanting to leave the industry.205 The Exiting Prostitution outflow is then affected 
                                               
204 Figure 12 shows the structural organization of the Las Vegas Base Model with the legalization 
policy changes based on qualitative analysis from sources in Chapter II and footnotes 191–202. 
205 Farley, Prostitution and Trafficking in Nevada, 29 (Farley, claims that 89% of women in Nevada’s 
legal brothels want to exit); Wagner, Whitmer, and Spivak, Experiences of Youth, 37 (Wagner, Whitmer, 
and Spivak state that 96% of youth respondents in the Las Vegas sex trade attempted to exit). 
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by the rate of the Reform Effectiveness. The changes in law enforcement effectiveness were 
also incorporated in the supply and demand sides of the markets. It was assumed that 
increased Law Enforcement Cooperation would raise law enforcement effectiveness 
converters to a constant value of 30% for both illegal supply (trafficking victims) and 
demand. While there are many human rights organizations around the world that advocate 
for the legalization of prostitution, at the opposite end of the prostitution policy spectrum 
are the abolitionists. 
2. Abolition (Nordic Model) 
Abolitionists believe that commercial sex is akin to modern-day slavery, and that 
purchasing sex is a form of sex trafficking regardless of the agency of the supplier.206 
Under this paradigm, the supplier (e.g., a prostitute) is always considered a victim and is 
decriminalized, while the purchaser, and any third party, such as a pimp, facilitator, 
manager, madame, or trafficker is still considered a criminal. This concept places more 
emphasis on prosecuting demand, due to the abolitionist belief that demand fuels the 
commercial sex industry, creating a market where sex trafficking will meet the need.207 
Sweden was the first country to adopt the abolition policy in 1999, but has since been 
joined by Norway and Iceland. Sweden has implemented social policies supporting 
survivors and educated the public about the “gendered nature of prostitution,” resulting in 
the successful movement of the “underground violence perpetrated against women and 
children in the sex industry to the forefront of Swedish politics.”208 Hence, the abolition 
policy is commonly referred to as the Swedish or Nordic Model. The Nordic Model has 
been very effective in reducing visible forms of commercial sex in the Scandinavian region. 
According to a 2014 report, street prostitution in Sweden has been reduced by 50%, while 
men admitting to purchasing sex has dropped by 40%.209 Additionally, Sweden has 
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become an “unattractive destination country for traffickers, pimps, and sex buyers,” 
resulting in a relatively small proportion of trafficking victims, around 200–400 per 
year.210 Norway has experienced similar success after their abolition policy adoption in 
2009.211  
Another theoretical benefit of the Nordic Model is the removal of the criminal 
stigma, thereby allowing improved safety and police cooperation. In Figure 13, we can see 
how the Nordic Policy change would affect feedback loops within the Las Vegas system. 
In the Abolition Policy CLD, the Demand Reduction Efforts within the Law Enforcement 
Loop, will affect the Illegal Sex Economy Loop and the Law Enforcement Loop. In the 
Illegal Sex Economy Loop, as Demand Reduction Efforts increase, the number of 
Traffickers decrease, which decreases Illegal Market Supply. Also, as the Demand 
Reduction Efforts increase, the Arrest Rate of Clients would increase, causing a reduction 
in Illegal Clients, further reducing Illegal Market Demand. Like the Legalization Policy 
CLD, the Illegal Sex Economy and Law Enforcement Loops are balancing. Thus, the overall 
effect of the policy change would be dependent on loop dominance within the system. 
                                               
210 Mathieson, Branam, and Noble, “Prostitution Policy,” 402. 
211 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 73. 
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Figure 13. Abolition Policy Causal Loop Diagram212 
The Base Model was altered to incorporate the Abolition Policy changes in Figure 
14. Due to the increased prosecution of demand, the model incorporates converters labeled 
Rate of Local Buyers and Tourism Buyers Deterred. These converters model the deterrence 
effect that an increased risk of arrest and prosecution would have on potential buyers. 
Assuming the buyers are rational actors, as the risks of arrest are increased past a certain 
threshold, their willingness to purchase sex would decrease. Therefore, the Buyers 
Deterred converter uses a graphical interface to increase the deterrence effect in direct 
relation to the increased law enforcement efforts. 
                                               
212 Figure 13 depicts causal relationships within the Las Vegas Base Model with Abolition policy 




Figure 14. Abolition Policy Changes to Base Model Stock and Flow 
Diagram213 
In Figure 15, we can see that as the Law Enforcement Efforts on Illegal Demand 
converter is increased, the Rate of Deterrence increases linearly at roughly a 1:1 ratio. The 
Law Enforcement Efforts on Illegal Demand converter was set to a constant of 30%, which 
equates to a Deterrence Effect of about 30%. The Deterrence Effect is then multiplied by 
the Rate of Demand for locals and tourists to determine the inflow of buyers into the Total 
Demand stock. Since the Law Enforcement Efforts on Illegal Demand is increasing, the 
outflow rate of demand (buyers that are incarcerated) will also increase. Both changes 
                                               
213 Figure 14 shows the structural changes made to the Las Vegas Base Model based on qualitative 
analysis of sources in Chapter II and footnotes 206–211. 
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should decrease Total Demand in the system. A Hybrid policy that combines aspects of 
Legalization and Abolition has also been discussed in prostitution policy discourse. 
 
Figure 15. Graphic of Rate of Buyers Deterred Converter214 
3. Hybrid  
The Hybrid approach to prostitution policy was offered by Lee and Perrson in 2015. 
It is a combination of the Legalization and Abolition models, by licensing and regulating 
                                               
214 Figure 15 provides a graphical depiction of the deterrence effect on buyers created by an increased 
prosecution of demand. Rowe, “Regulating Sex Work,” 44; Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 73; Di 
Nicola et al., “Prostitution and Human Trafficking,” 169. 
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prostitution and criminalizing the purchase of unlicensed sex.215 Therefore, even though 
prostitution would still be illegal under this policy option, it would incorporate the legalized 
regulation for those that willingly participate in the industry. This would force willing 
prostitutes to register and obtain “work cards” similar to Dutch, German, and Nevada legal 
brothel practices. Additionally, the policy would prosecute demand for buyers of 
undocumented sex workers, with the assumption that those who are undocumented are 
likely victims of trafficking. Due to the combination of the two policies, the Hybrid Model 
provides benefits from both. 
There are several benefits associated with the Legalization Policy that would 
manifest in the Hybrid approach. First, the prostitutes that choose to work in the sex 
industry would be afforded the right to do so within regulatory stipulations, while victims 
of trafficking, assault, and other criminal activity would no longer be treated as criminals. 
Next, a Hybrid Model may also have the demand reduction effect of the Nordic Policy. It 
will allow increased prostitution cooperation with police to identify illegal activity, but it 
also places the onus on the buyer to ensure that the supplier has proper documentation. If 
sex is purchased without this verification process, and the supplier turns out to be a 
trafficked victim, the buyer could suffer increased penalties. Finally, the same reform 
program construct discussed in the Legalization Policy could also be implemented. Legal 
prostitutes would still need to purchase “work cards,” creating revenue to increase social 
services, vocational, and reform programs. Ultimately, this policy could decrease supply 
and demand, rather than fixating on one side of the market. In Figure 16, we can see the 
feedback loops of the Hybrid Policy within the sex industry. 
                                               
215 Samuel Lee and Petra Persson, “Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution,” (working paper 12–




Figure 16. Hybrid Policy Causal Loop Diagram216 
Like the Legalization CLD, the Hybrid CLD incorporates regulation in the 
Prostitution Reform Loop. As Hybrid Policy Efforts increase, Underground Market activity 
would increase as criminals attempt to circumvent regulation policies. As a result, 
Regulation would increase, along with Regulation Taxes, creating more Prostitution 
Reform Programs. This would eventually lead to less Prostitutes, while increased 
Prostitution Cooperation with Law Enforcement would also lead to fewer Victims. 
Additionally, increased Arrest Rates of Clients, would lead to fewer Illegal Clients, 
ultimately decreasing Illegal Market Demand. The changes the Hybrid Policy would have 
on the Base Model stock and flow diagram are the combination of Figure 12 and 14. 
                                               
216 Figure 16 illustrates the causal relationships within the Las Vegas Base Model with Hybrid policy 
changes. These changes were made based on qualitative assessments from Lee and Persson, “Human 
Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution.”  
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Therefore, the Hybrid Model reflects the reform program effect on prostitution and the 
increased prostitution cooperation effect with law enforcement to identify and rescue 
trafficking victims. Also, it models the effect of increased prosecution of demand and the 
deterrent effect that it will have on potential buyers. Beyond prostitution policy changes, 
there are social service actions that can be taken to reduce the illicit sex market in Las 
Vegas. 
4. Victim Advocacy 
Incorporating an effective Victim Advocacy Policy must begin with developing 
trust between the victims and first responders. Understanding that fraud is why many 
trafficking victims are in their current position, is key to developing trust.217 This begins 
by offering victims agency and accepting their life choices rather than passing 
judgement.218 Unfortunately, the LVMPD has created significant barriers to trust 
development with victims. According to a 2014 report conducted by the LVMPD, one of 
the largest barriers to attaining a successful prosecution of traffickers is “victim 
maintenance,” but “law enforcement is often underprepared to assist.”219 Trust is further 
deteriorated by a tendency to arrest victims first and ask questions regarding their 
circumstance later. Shared Hope International, claims that minor sex trafficking victims, 
who identify as prostitutes, are arrested and placed in the Clark County Juvenile Detention 
Center, rather than being routed to the social services they require.220 Lieutenant Patricia 
Spencer of the LVMPD Human Trafficking Investigations Unit (HTIU) recommends 
improving law enforcement’s education in victim identification and embedding specially 
trained victim advocates directly into responding HTIU and Vice units.221 In addition to 
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building trust, the victims’ cases must be managed more effectively to prosecute traffickers 
more often. 
Effective case management could come in the form of interdisciplinary teams of 
health, psychological, and social service professionals, that offer a victim-centered, single 
point-of-contact delivery paradigm.222 Clinicians providing care should be educated in 
culturally relevant intervention strategies that account for the victim’s age and 
developmental stage, as well as the type and length of exploitation experienced.223 Finally, 
victims may benefit from long-term care facilities, which allow them to hear first-hand 
testimony of other victims’ success, and allows a rapport to be gradually built with 
clinicians. According to some reports, similar programs have had up to a 75% success 
rate.224 The causes and effects of a Victim Advocacy Policy are depicted in Figure 17. 
Within the Law Enforcement Loop, as the Illegal Sex Economy increases, it increases the 
Victim Identification Education Requirements, increasing both Law Enforcement 
Awareness and Health Care and Social Service Awareness. Increased awareness would 
improve Victim Identification and Victim Case Management, resulting in an increase in 
Victim Rapport Building. The result of increased Rapport Building is fewer Victims and an 
increase in Prosecution of Traffickers. 
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Figure 17. Victim Advocacy Policy Causal Loop Diagram225 
Figure 18 illustrates how the Victim Advocacy Policy was modeled. The major 
changes made to simulate the Victim Advocacy Policy center around the increased ability 
to identify victims due to education and increased services availability. This change is 
enacted in the model through the Increased Services Identification converter and held at a 
constant of 10%, allowing for a 10% increase in victim identification. This converter works 
in conjunction with the Effect of Law Enforcement Focus on Trafficking converter to 
increase the Rescued outflow rate from the Supply of Victims stock. The Effect of Law 
Enforcement Focus on Trafficking converter is held constant at 30%. 
                                               
225 Figure 17 shows the causal relationships within the Las Vegas Base Model with a victim advocacy 
policy based on qualitative analysis of sources from Chapter II and footnotes 217–224.  
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Figure 18. Victim Advocacy Policy Changes to Base Model Stock and Flow 
Diagram226 
Additionally, due to the increase in victim identification and services that build trust 
within the policy, trafficker conviction rate would increase. An increased conviction rate 
would have a deterrent effect on current or prospective traffickers. This effect is modeled 
through the Effect of Trafficker Conviction Rate. This converter takes the percentage of 
Effect of Law Enforcement Focus on Trafficking and converts it to a linear 1:1 ratio of 
deterrent effect, like the deterrent effect modeled in the Nordic Policy (see Figure 19). In 
other words, with a 30% law enforcement effect, there will be an additional 30% deterrent 
effect on traffickers. Although care is required for the long-term well-being of the victims 
and eventual prosecution of traffickers, this policy alone may not be effective in reducing 
the number of victims in the industry. A more proactive policy approach could take the 
form of Resilience Education. 
                                               
226 Figure 18 depicts the structural changes to the Las Vegas Base Model incorporating a victim 
advocacy policy based on qualitative analysis of sources from Chapter II and footnotes 217–224. 
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Figure 19. Graphical Depiction of Effect of Trafficker Conviction Rate 
Converter227 
5. Resilience Education 
Resilience Education would be the first proactive policy presented to combat 
trafficking. Rather than relying on the fear of penalty as a deterrent to selling or purchasing 
sex, Resilience Education would take a holistic reform approach. First, individuals would 
be educated, followed by families, and the community. Eventually, the overall culture of 
the city would reflect change. Resilience skills can be described as social competency, 
                                               
227 Figure 19 shows the deterrent effect on traffickers based on increased conviction rates. The 
increase to 30% is based on reported conviction rates from Spencer et al., Las Vegas Sex Trafficking Case 
Study, of 12%. Assuming increased rapport building and victim cooperation, the conviction rate was 
increased to 30% as a starting point for analysis. 
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metacognition, autonomy, and purpose and direction.228 A Resilience Education program 
developed in Atlanta, Georgia to combat trafficking, known as iSeeMe, provides four 
protective factors which Las Vegas can build on:  
1. “Provide an opportunity for at least one stable and caring adult 
relationship.”229 
2. “Build a sense of self efficacy and perceived control.”230 
3. “Provide opportunities to strengthen adaptive skills.”231 
4. “Apply belief systems and cultural traditions.”232 
Since many trafficking victims come from high risk homes, their parents or 
relatives may not be the best choice for a “stable and caring” adult relationship. Therefore, 
the easiest, most obvious alternative would be teachers, school staff, or faith leaders. 
School staff and community members providing caring relationships, high positive 
expectations, and the ability to participate and contribute were successful in fostering 
resilience in youth.233 One study found that Resilience Education had up to a 70% 
effectiveness rate for children born into high risk households, including alcoholism, drug 
abuse, physical and sexual violence, and mental illness.234 Furthermore, the Project of 
Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods found that 85% of youth exposed to 
violent trauma were able to successfully adapt by building emotional resilience.235 The 
Resilience Education Causal Loop Diagram in Figure 20, demonstrates the cause and effect 
relationships of the Resilience Education Policy. 
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Figure 20. Resilience Education Policy Causal Loop Diagram236 
The Resilience Education Policy CLD indicates, that as the Resilience Education 
campaign increases, Youth Awareness of Trafficking also increases. Consequently, this 
decreases the number of Victims and Prostitutes in the system. Also, increased Youth 
Awareness of Trafficking decreases the number of Traffickers and Illegal Market Demand. 
As a result, this would further decrease the amount of trafficking victims. This change to 
the system is modeled in Figure 21.  
                                               
236 Figure 20 illustrates the causal relationships within the Las Vegas Base Model with a Resilience 
Education policy based on qualitative analysis of sources in Chapter II and footnotes 228–235. 
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Figure 21. Resilience Education Changes to Base Model Stock and Flow 
Diagram237 
The Resilience Education Policy model incorporates another SI-like equation to 
simulate its effects on the system. The number of educated children grows over time based 
on the expansion of the resilience campaign across Clark County School District (CCSD). 
The Child Contact Rate outflow replicates the capability of the campaign to reach the 
maximum number of children within a given time. The outflow rate uses a RAMP function 
to simulate that 25% of the children in CCSD would receive Resilience Education upon 
                                               
237 Figure 21 depicts the structural changes to the Las Vegas Base Model with a Resilience Education 
policy based on qualitative analysis of sources in Chapter II and footnotes 228–235. 
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policy implementation, while 75% of the children in the school district would be educated 
within a five-year period. This outflow rate, combined with the Success Rate of Resiliency 
Education converter, feed into the Effectiveness of Child Resiliency Edu converter. The 
Success Rate converter is assumed to be a constant of 40%. This may be conservative based 
on the studies previously mentioned but is a good starting point for model exploration. The 
Effectiveness of Child Resiliency Edu converter is then combined with the Trafficking 
Profit Effect to determine the inflow rate of children into the Supply of Child Victims stock. 
Note that in Figure 21, the victims have been separated into a Supply of Child Victims stock 
and a Supply of Adult Victims stock to better delineate the effect of education on the two 
populations separately.  
The Adult population stock is also eventually affected by the Resilience Education 
Policy. As the educated children reach the maturation period, they will enter the Adult 
stock. If they are part of the educated child population (Child Contact Rate outflow), they 
will be less likely to enter the sex industry. The Success Rate and Effectiveness of Adult 
Resiliency Edu converters have the same assumptions as those in the child population.  
The next chapter of this study will focus on the modeling exploration of each of the 
policies, followed by policy combinations, and accounting for uncertainty within the initial 
stock values.  
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V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The results section will explore how each of the policies effect the underground sex 
market relative to the Base Model. The economic aspects of price and profit and their 
effects on supply and demand within the market will be particularly scrutinized. All the 
policies were modeled individually within a 50-year time horizon, and with a Delta Time 
(DT) of 0.25. This is followed by the results of a combination of policies that appear to be 
the most effective. Finally, the most successful policy combination will be tested for 
sensitivity within the system, due to the moderate estimates of the Base Model initial stock 
values.  
B. BASE MODEL RESULTS 
Assuming the moderate initial supply and demand stock values are representative 
of Las Vegas’ illicit sex market, the initial Supply/Demand Ratio is relatively close to one. 
As the system seeks an equilibrium price, it causes an initial fluctuation between price, 
profits, and supply and demand. As we can see in the left graph of Figure 22, labeled “Profit 
Effect on Supply,” once the price reaches an equilibrium of about $190, the Prostitution 
and Trafficking Profit Effect converters stabilize. Prostitution Profit Effect is slightly 
negative because the initial price of $200 was reduced, driving down profitability. 
However, Trafficking Profit Effect is more resistant to price reductions, and causes the 
Supply of Victims stock to increase 
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Figure 22. Base Model Results238 
In the “Profit Per Participant v. Supply & Demand” graph on the right side of Figure 
22, we can see the relationship between profits and Supply of Prostitutes and Victims 
stocks. Victims increase due to the increase in Total Demand and positive Trafficking 
Profit Effect on the system over time. Additionally, as prostitutes leave, they are creating 
more Profit Per Participant for traffickers, creating a positive reinforcing behavior within 
the system. In other words, as prostitutes leave a void in the supply market, traffickers 
make more profit and increase the total victims to meet the demand. This increase in 
victims to meet market demand makes the market less profitable for future prostitutes, 
reinforcing the disparity between Supply of Victims and Prostitutes stocks over time. These 
results indicate that with the current criminalization policy, neither Total Demand nor the 
Supply of Victims will dissipate in the future. This corroborates previous studies that 
indicate that the current criminalization paradigm in America is counterproductive for 
                                               
238 Figure 22 shows the results of the Las Vegas Base Model under its current prostitution policy 
paradigm. All the modeling assumptions are discussed within Chapters II, III, and IV. 
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decreasing trafficking victims.239 Thus, three alternative prostitution policy alternatives 
were also explored. 
C. LEGALIZATION POLICY RESULTS 
As we can see in the left graph in Figure 23, labeled “Legalization Policy Profit 
Effect on Supply,” there is a similar profit effect as the Base Model. Again, there is a Price 
equilibrium close to $190, causing a slightly positive Trafficking Profit Effect and slightly 
negative Prostitution Profit Effect.  
 
Figure 23. Legalization Policy Results240 
Additionally, when comparing the effects of Legalization to the Base Model in 
Figure 22, there are subtle differences in the supply stock behaviors and Total Demand 
stock values. The Legalization Model’s Supply of Victims had a negative profit effect for a 
longer duration. However, with Total Demand growing over time, the price eventually 
stabilizes with a positive Trafficking Profit Effect, while continuing to create a reduction 
in prostitutes. The Legalization Policy system appears to have a negative reinforcing effect 
                                               
239 Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 36, 66; Kovari and Pruyt, “A Model Based Exploration,” 53. 
240 Figure 24 shows the results of a legalization policy on the Las Vegas commercial sex market 
based on assumptions and sources listed in Chapters II, III, and IV as well as footnotes 239 and 241.  
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on the Supply of Prostitutes stock. In the Legalization Model, the Supply of Prostitutes 
stock is not only being replaced by victims, but it is also diminishing via the reform 
programs within the model. 
Furthermore, as the rate of outflow of Supply of Prostitutes increases, the rate of 
inflow for the Supply of Victims stock increases to meet demand. Referencing Table 1, we 
can see a comparison of rates of change between the Supply of Prostitutes, Victims, and 
Total Demand stocks within the Base and Legalization Models for the final 25 years of the 
simulation period. In the Base Model there is a mean prostitution outflow rate of 191.9, 
whereas that of the Legalization Model is 224.4. Also, the mean inflow rate of Total 
Demand for the Legalization Model is greater than that of the Base Model by more than 
500 people per year. This creates a supply deficit, and a corresponding inflow rate increase 
of victims within the Legalization Model. 
Another notable result from the Legalization simulation was that the final stock of 
Total Demand increased by 5,900 as compared to the Base Model. This finding supports 
previous studies conducted on legalization policies in other locations, such as the 
Netherlands and Germany.241 Additionally, while the Legalization Policy depletes the 
Supply of Prostitutes stock, the rate at which victims are being forced into the market 
increases as prostitutes exit, concluding with a Supply of Victims stock that is more than 
14,000 greater than that of the Base Model. Based on these models, demand is likely 
driving the increase in supply. Therefore, without a policy that targets demand, it may not 
be possible to reduce the supply of a sex market. The Nordic policy is intended to reduce 
demand and will be explored next. 
 
  
                                               
241 Kovari and Pruyt, “A Model-Based Exploration,”53; Kathryn Rowe, “Regulating Sex Work: 
United States’ Policy and International Comparison,” (PhD dissertation, University of Mississippi, 2018), 
49. 
77 




D. ABOLITION (NORDIC) POLICY RESULTS 
As we can see in Figure 24, the difference between the Nordic Policy and those 
previously modeled is in the total stock values at the end of the simulation time. Of all the 
prostitution-oriented policies explored in this study, the Nordic Policy has the largest effect 
on reducing total supply and demand. 
                                               
242 Table 1 shows a comparison of the legalization policy and Base Model rates of change. The results 
were taken from the previously discussed models based on assumptions and sources listed in Chapters II, 




Figure 24. Nordic Policy Results243 
Table 2 provides a comparison of all the prostitution policies as they relate to the 
Base Model. As we can see, the Nordic Policy offers the largest reduction in supply stocks 
(both prostitutes and victims) and Total Demand stock. Next, the Supply of Prostitutes 
stock experiences a higher rate of decay sooner within the simulation window as compared 
to the previous models. This maximizes the Profit Per Participant sooner, as prostitutes 
are exiting the market at a faster rate than in the Legalization Policy Model.  
 
                                               
243 Figure 25 illustrates the results of a Nordic policy in the Las Vegas commercial sex market 
modeled through sources and assumptions described in Chapters II, III, and IV. 
79 
Table 2. Prostitution Policy Comparison244 
 
 
As Table 3 shows, the peak outflow rate of prostitutes occurs within the first 15 
years of the simulation, compared to the Legalization Model, where peak prostitution 
outflow did not occur until 25 years. However, due to the increase in Rate of Local and 
Tourism Buyers Deterred, the Total Demand stock grows at a slower rate, which allows a 
greater rate of Total Demand stock growth. This slower rate of Total Demand growth 
results in a slower rate of Supply of Victims stock growth. 
                                               
244 Table 2 shows a comparison of final stock values for supply and demand within all the prostitution 
policies relative to the Base Model. The data for the table were pulled from the models described in 
Chapters II, III, and IV. 
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Table 3. Nordic Model Rate of Change245 
 
 
E. HYBRID POLICY RESULTS 
The results of the Hybrid Model simulation are like the Legalization and Nordic 
Models. However, in this model, the price takes longer to adjust to an equilibrium, causing 
the continuation of a negative Prostitution Profit Effect and a longer bottoming-out period 
for the Supply of Victims stock (see Figure 25). Additionally, the Total Demand stock 
behaves very similarly to the Nordic Model but recovers from its price adjustment losses 
sooner. Finally, the Supply of Prostitutes stock follows the same pattern as the Legalization 
Model, with an increasing rate of outflow toward the end of the simulation window. A 
lower price coupled with an initially higher stock of Supply of Prostitutes and Victims likely 
increased the rate at which the demand stock filled, despite the policy’s deterrent effects 
on demand. 
                                               
245 Table 3 illustrates the rate of change within the Nordic policy. The data for the table were taken 
from the modeling results based on sources listed in Chapters II, III, and IV.  
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Figure 25. Hybrid Policy Results246 
All the prostitution policies (Legalization, Nordic, and Hybrid) significantly reduce 
the Supply of Prostitutes stock within the market. However, these policies do not diminish 
the Supply of Victims, causing the Total Demand stocks to grow. Therefore, the next two 
policy options will try to reduce the Supply of Victims stock. 
F. VICTIM ADVOCACY POLICY RESULTS 
In Figure 26, the results of the default Victim Advocacy Policy settings are 
presented. The most obvious difference between the Victim Advocacy Policy results and 
the other policies modeled is that the Supply of Prostitutes, Victims, and Total Demand 
stocks do not decrease. Relative to the Base Model, there is a 23% increase in the supply 
stocks (prostitutes and victims combined) during the 50-year time horizon, Additionally, 
there is a 27% increase in the Total Demand stock compared to the Base Model. When 
measuring only the Supply of Victims, the Victim Advocacy Policy has the most success, 
reducing that stock value by more than 15,000 victims. However, due to the lack of 
                                               
246 Figure 25 illustrates the results of a Hybrid policy in the Las Vegas commercial sex market 
modeled through sources and assumptions described in Chapters II, III, and IV. 
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reduction in the Supply of Prostitutes stock, the total supply remains high enough to 
increase the Total Demand stock. If law enforcement efforts on trafficking and services 
identification all increased to 40%, as depicted in Figure 26, the victim population is 
reduced. 
 
Figure 26. Victim Advocacy Policy Results247 
In Figure 27, the Effects of Increased Services Identification and Law Enforcement 
are depicted. The meters on the top left of the figure, show the increase of the converters 
to 40%, indicating that police would be able to arrest 40% of the traffickers and buyers, 
while service professionals would also be able to identify 40% of the trafficking victims 
that they treat. The meters on the bottom are a visual depiction of the success of the policy 
relative to the Base Model. If the meter needle is in a red region, this indicates that the final 
stock value is greater than that of the Base Model. The yellow region of the meter indicates 
a stock value that falls between the starting and final values of the Base Model. Finally, the 
green region represents a final stock value that is better than that of the Base Model. As 
shown, the final stock values of the Supply of Prostitutes and Total Demand stocks are 
                                               
247 Figure 26 shows the results of a Victim Advocacy policy in the Las Vegas commercial sex market 
modeled through sources and assumptions described in Chapters II, III, and IV.  
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worse than the Base Model, whereas the Supply of Victims stock is better. These results are 
opposite of what was seen in the prostitution policies, where the reduction in Supply of 
Prostitutes stock was being replaced with the Supply of Victims stock. Here, the reduction 
in victims is being replaced with an increase in prostitutes.  
 
Figure 27. Effects of Increased Services Identification and Law 
Enforcement248 
These findings indicate that policies solely aimed at reducing trafficking victims 
will likely do little to reduce the overall market for illicit sex. Part of the problem with a 
victim centric policy approach, is that it is reactive in nature. It requires the victims to be 
identified and cooperative throughout the judicial process to achieve any deterrent effect 
against traffickers. However, a more proactive approach in the form of Resilience 
Education, may be able to reduce all of the stocks within the system. 
                                               
248 Figure 28 shows the effect of an increased rate of services and law enforcement identification of 
victims within the model. It was assumed that increasing education among services professionals would 
allow increased identification, while law enforcement would be able to build a rapport within victims to 
help identification and conviction of traffickers.  
84 
G. RESILIENCE EDUCATION POLICY RESULTS 
The results of the Resilience Education Policy are displayed in Figure 28. As shown 
in the graph on the left labeled “Resilience Education Policy Profit Effect on Supply,” a 
more significant increase in Price, Prostitution, and Trafficking Profit Effect. In previous 
model simulations, this increase in profit would have caused an increased inflow of Supply 
of Prostitutes and Victims. However, since the policy is making these populations resilient 
to entering or being coerced into the market, the stocks in the system all decrease until 40 
years into the simulation’s run. After the 40-year mark, it appears that the population 
growth is outpacing the education contact rate, causing a subsequent increase in trafficking 
rates. Note, that the graph on the right includes the Supply of Child Victims and Adult 
Victims stocks to delineate how the education program would impact both populations.  
 
Figure 28. Resilience Education Policy Results249 
                                               
249 Figure 29 shows the results of a Resilience Education policy in the Las Vegas commercial sex 
market modeled through sources and assumptions described in Chapters II, III, and IV . 
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The child population is the first to be affected by this policy. Thus, from the onset 
of its implementation, there is a steady decrease in the Supply of Child Victims stock. The 
Adult Victims stock also decreases because the child population gradually matures into 
adulthood. Based on the 18-year maturation period in the model, the Supply of Adult Victim 
stock outflow rate is less than that of the Supply of Child Victims. This ultimately ends with 
a 77% reduction in the total victim stock (children and adults combined), as compared to 
the Base Model final Supply of Victims stock value. A similar trend is true for the Supply 
of Prostitutes stock in the simulations. 
Even with a rising Profit Per Participant, the Supply of Prostitutes decreases. 
Additionally, the Supply of Prostitutes stock does not rise with the rise in Total Demand 
stock after the 40-year mark. This is because prostitutes are willingly participating in the 
market. Finally, Total Demand shows a 42% reduction from the Base Model’s final stock 
value (see Table 4). These results indicate that creating trafficking resistant populations 
may be a more comprehensive means of reducing the market for commercial sex.  
Table 4. Services Policy Comparison250 
 
 
                                               
250 Table 4 illustrates a comparison of the services policies relative to the Base Model. The data for 
the table were taken from the respective policy models based on sources and assumptions listed in Chapters 
II, III, and IV. 
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One of the critical assumptions regarding the modeling of this policy is the Success 
Rate of Resiliency Edu converter. The converter is a constant of 40%, meaning that 40% 
of the children that are exposed to the Resilience Education curriculum, would avoid the 
illicit sex market. The success rate chosen for this study was a moderate qualitative 
assumption based on varying success rates in similar youth education programs.  
Although, quantitative research on resilience success rates is limited, 40% may 
actually be conservative based on one study claiming success rates of greater than 
70%.251At a 70% or better rate of success, the Resilience Policy results in all of the stocks 
decreasing over the time horizon (top of Figure 29). However, other education programs 
pertaining to drug and alcohol avoidance, abstinence, and sex education, have had varied 
levels of success.252 Therefore, if the success rate is less than assumed, the system may 
not have such favorable outcomes. For example, if the Success Rate of Resiliency Edu 
converter is set to 15%, the Total Demand and Supply of Adult Victims stocks are increasing 
at the end of the simulation period (bottom of Figure 29). Since, it will be several years 
after the implementation of a Resilience Education Policy until its effectiveness is 
understood, it may be worth hedging against the possibility of lower success rates with 
policy combinations.  
                                               
251 Jain et al., “Protective Factors for Youth Exposed to Violence,” 107. 
252 Hennessy and Smith, “Effectiveness of Brief School-Based Interventions for Adolescents,”; 
Botvin et al., “Effectiveness of Culturally Focused and Generic Skills,”; Botvin et al., “Long-Term Follow-
Up Resul,”,; Kirby, “Research on Effectiveness of Sex Education Programs,”; Kirby, and Alter, “The 




Figure 29. Resilience Education Policy with Improved (Top) and Reduced 
Effectiveness Rates (Bottom)253 
                                               
253 Figure 30 shows a comparison of Resilience Education policies with increased and reduced 
effectiveness rates. The results are based on sources listed in Chapters II, III, and IV, as well as footnotes 
251–252. 
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H. NORDIC-RESILIENCE AND HYBRID-RESILIENCE POLICY 
COMBINATION RESULTS 
The two most successful individual prostitution policies modeled were the Nordic 
and Hybrid approaches. Also, the most successful services policy modeled was Resilience 
Education. Therefore, the following section will discuss the modeling results obtained by 
combing each of the Nordic and Hybrid policies with the Resilience Policy to hedge against 
a less successful Resilience Education policy. 
The following results assume a 15% Success Rate of Resiliency Edu converter with 
the default prostitution reform settings for % Wanting to Leave the Industry (50%) and 
Reform Capacity (500/year). Additionally, all the Law Enforcement converters were held 
constant at 30% for both models. In Figure 30, both graphs show initial declines of all 
stocks. This coincides with increasing price and profit as was seen in the Resilience 
Education Policy results. However, because the success rate of the education program is 
only 15%, the population growth outpaces the effectiveness of the education program 
earlier in the simulation. 
 
Figure 30. Resilience, Hybrid, and Nordic Policy Combination Results254 
                                               
254 Figure 31 depicts a comparison of the Nordic and Hybrid policies when they are combined with 
the Resilience Education policy. The results are a product of the models created from sources and 
assumptions listed in Chapters II, III, and IV.  
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Both policy combinations have similar final stock values. The Hybrid-Resilience 
Policy yields the best Supply of Prostitutes stock with a final value of 41, compared to 161 
in the Nordic-Resilience Policy. The Hybrid combination also yields a slightly higher Total 
Demand stock with 17,200 versus 16,700 in the Nordic by the end of the simulation run. 
As Figure 31 demonstrates, both policy combinations produce significantly lower stock 
values than any of the other policies individually, but the stocks are increasing at the end 
of the 50-year window.  
A limitation of the Nordic-Resilience Policy combination is that it is almost solely 
reliant on the effectiveness of the education policy implementation. Therefore, care should 
be taken to ensure education programs are effective and feedback mechanisms should be 
created to assess their effectiveness often. This will allow any deficiencies in the 
curriculum to be identified and rectified prior to the point where the population and 
profitability of the market overpower the program’s effectiveness. 
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Figure 31. Hybrid/Nordic-Resilience Combination Comparison255 
Conversely, when using the Hybrid-Resilience combination, the Yearly Reform 
Capacity converter can be manipulated by increasing the frequency or occupancy of reform 
programs, or by increasing the Work Card Tax to increase revenue. Additionally, if the % 
Wanting to Leave the Industry converter is actually closer to 80% as some research 
indicates, and the Yearly Reform Capacity converter is increased to 750 people/year, 
outflow rate in the Supply of Prostitutes stock would increase.256 Figure 32, reflects the 
results of these settings within the model. As expected, increasing the rate at which 
                                               
255 Figure 31 shows a comparison of the policy combinations using a reduced (15%) Resilience 
Education effectiveness rate. Data was gather based on footnote 253–254. 
256 Farley, Prostitution and Trafficking in Nevada, 29 
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prostitutes leave the market empties the Supply of Prostitutes stock before the end of the 
simulation. However, like the previous prostitution models, the increased outflow rate of 
prostitutes from the system increases the inflow of total victims. As Figure 32 shows, there 
are nearly 1,000 more victims in each of the victim stocks. The Total Demand stock also 
increases as a result of the increase in victims. 
 
Figure 32. Hybrid Combination with Increased Reform Capacity257 
Finally, if the Success of Resiliency Edu converter is increased to 20%, there is a 
more noticeable difference between the two policy combinations. As Table 5 indicates, the 
Hybrid combination results in just over 18,000 total victims and 20,000 Total Demand, 
whereas the Nordic combination results in 13,000 total victims and 16,000 Total Demand. 
It appears that despite its reliance on the success of the education program, the Nordic 
                                               
257 Figure 32 shows the Hybrid-Resilience Education policy combination, with reduced resilience and 
increased prostitution reform settings. The results are a product of the models created from sources and 
assumptions listed in Chapters II, III, and IV, as well as footnote 256. 
92 
combination may produce better results in situations where the Resilience Education policy 
may be minimally effective.  




I. EXPLORING UNCERTAINTY 
The modeling results in the previous section were based on moderate estimates for 
the initial supply and demand stock values in each of the models. However, if the initial 
stocks in the sex market are higher, the policies could result in different market behavior 
over time. Therefore, the results presented in this section will discuss modeling based on 
initializing these stocks with the highest estimated values found within the Las Vegas 
literature. Accordingly, the Supply of Prostitutes stock will be initialized at 30,000, the 
Supply of Victims at 10,000 (assuming half of the stock are children and half are adults), 
                                               
258 Table 5 shows a comparison of the Hybrid-Resilience and Nordic-Resilience combination policies. 
The resilience success rate was set to 15%, the % wanting to leave the industry was set to 50% and yearly 
reform capacity at 500/year, while the law enforcement converters were all set to 30%. Data for the table 
were taken from the results section of this chapter.  
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and the Total Demand stock at 64,000 (see Table 6 for Base Model Initial Value 
Comparison).259 The Total Demand stock is the sum of 15% of the local population and 
an inflow rate of tourist buyers that is twice that of the Base Model (0.08%). 
Table 6. “Worst-Case” Model Initial Value Comparison260 
 
 
The Nordic-Resilience combination policy will be used to explore the effect on this 
“worst-case” model. The starting values for Law Enforcement converters (15%) and the 
corresponding deterrent effect were reduced assuming that the percentage of prosecution 
would be decreased in proportion to the increase in Total Demand stock. In other words, 
the number of officers in the LVMPD would not change with an increase in demand, 
making it difficult to prosecute a higher percentage of buyers. Additionally, the Success 
Rate of Resiliency Edu converter was initialized at 40%. 
In Figure 33, we can see similar trends to that of the moderate Nordic combination 
graph. Surprisingly, the depletion rates of the stocks are higher than those of the Base 
Model, creating a faster escalation in price, reinforcing the reduction in Total Demand. 
This occurs until just before 40 years into the model period, when profitability of the market 
                                               
259 Knowles, “A Bad Economy,”; Forrey, “America’s Disneyland of Sex,” 973; Nevada Coalition to 
Prevent the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, Strategic Plan to Address the Commercial Sexual 
Exploitation of Children in Nevada, 12; Nichols, Sex Trafficking in the US, 159. 
260 Table 6 shows the initial stock value changes for a “Worst-Case” model based the highest reported 
values in sources listed in footnote 259. 
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appears to increase the Supply of Adult Victims stock and the Total Demand stock increases 
in response to price fluctuations in the market.  
 
Figure 33. “Worst-Case” Nordic-Resilience Combination Results261 
However, even with the increase in those stocks at the 40-year mark, there is a 
negative trend in net stock flow rate at the end of the simulation for all stocks. Like the 
previous results, this may indicate, that the Success Rate of Resilience Education cannot 
keep pace with the population growth in the market, making a portion of the adult victims 
vulnerable to coercion. Also, when demand exists and the market remains profitable for 
traffickers to exploit vulnerable supply populations, the negative reinforcing behavior of 
the system may be more resistant to smaller fluctuations in market profitability and 
                                               
261 Figure 33 illustrates the results of a Nordic-Resilience combination policy under uncertainty. The 
data were pulled from the model based on sources and assumptions listed in Chapters II, III, and IV, as well 
as footnote 259.  
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demand. This is the case with the Supply of Adult Victims in this model. Again, this points 
to the vulnerability and fragility of victim stocks without adequate demand stock reduction 
measures. With these considerations in mind, it does appear that a Nordic-Resilience 
combination policy can be effective in reducing the commercial sex market in a system 
with stock values initialized closer to a “worst-case” scenario.  
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The sex market can be categorized as supply and demand. Furthermore, supply 
within the Las Vegas market can be divided into willing prostitutes and victims that are 
being sexually exploited. The demand aspect of the market is constituted by locals and 
tourists. The results of this study suggest that any policy aimed at disrupting exploitation 
within the commercial sex industry must be comprehensive and reduce all aspects of supply 
and demand. 
Although commonly advocated for, this study found that the Legalization Policy 
was the least effective at reducing sexual exploitation compared to the other policies 
modeled. Modeling prostitution rehabilitation/diversion initiatives caused the number of 
willing prostitutes within the industry to gradually decline. However, the legal market 
increased demand and victimization increased to compensate for the loss of prostitutes. As 
victims are forced into the system, the profitability for prostitutes decreases, further 
increasing the rate of departure of prostitutes from the system. The compounding effect 
exacerbates victim exploitation as traffickers work to accommodate rising demand. This 
indicates that a legal system striving to divert or rehabilitate its willing suppliers without 
measures to reduce victimization, may increase instances of sex trafficking. Therefore, sex 
trafficking policy change must account for a demand driven system. 
The Nordic Model is meant to suppress demand, thereby reducing supply 
requirements. This study’s Nordic Model was the most successful prostitution policy at 
comprehensively disrupting the commercial sex market. Overall, reducing demand, by 
increasing the likelihood of punishment, decreased the profitability for willing prostitutes 
as supply exceed demand. However, as their profits for drop, prostitutes exit the system at 
an accelerated rate, creating market opportunity for traffickers. This causes victimization, 
albeit at a slower rate than that of the legalized system, because prostitutes are only leaving 
the market as profits decline, not because of reform. As victims increase, demand also 
increases. However, demand reduction efforts keep the demand stock lower than that of 
the Legalization Model. These market interactions suggest that actions taken to reduce 
demand alone, may not stop victimization. Therefore, any demand reduction policies, like 
98 
the Nordic Model, must also be accompanied by measures that specifically target sex 
trafficking.  
The Hybrid Model is meant to decrease prostitution through reform and diversion 
programs, while reducing demand through increased prosecution of those who exploit 
trafficking victims. Although the Hybrid Policy resulted in reducing overall supply and 
demand to comparable levels of the Nordic Model, it suffered from the same supply 
reduction problems. As the Hybrid Model incorporates the same efforts to decrease 
prostitution as the Legalization Policy, prostitutes leave the system at a higher rate than the 
Base or Nordic Models. Additionally, although demand is being deterred similar to the 
Nordic Model, the lack of victim reduction coupled with increased market opportunity for 
traffickers, causes victimization to eventually escalate. This again, points to the need for 
victim-specific policy requirements if a prostitution policy is implemented.  
The Victim Advocacy Model sought to decrease victims through increased 
advocacy by identifying available services and improving trafficker conviction rates. The 
results of this model were similarly unsuccessful due to the policy’s singular focus on 
market supply. Thus, the Victim Advocacy Policy was successful at reducing the supply 
of victims relative to the Base Model but caused an increase in prostitution and demand. 
Therefore, if the intent of a counter sexual exploitation policy is to decrease the entire 
commercial sex market, a policy that aims to limit victimization should be implemented in 
conjunction with measures that reduce prostitutes and demand.  
A policy that may be effective in comprehensively reducing the Las Vegas sex 
market is Resilience Education. Such a policy is useful because, over a long-term, it can 
change the culture of tolerance that exists in Las Vegas. The Resilience Education Policy 
was the most successful single model explored. It was able to gradually reduce aspects of 
the market for most of the model timeframe. However, due to the growth in tourism and 
the lack of Resilience Education within the tourist population, demand eventually began to 
grow. Also, because an education program can only have a finite level of success within 
the local population, as the population growth outpaced the policy’s success rate, a larger 
portion of the local population eventually became susceptible to victimization. Therefore, 
as tourism demand increased over time and improved profitability, trafficking increased as 
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an exploitable population became available. This nuance of the system indicates that either 
a Resilience Education program can only be effective for long durations if it is conducted 
at the regional or national levels, or additional policies are directed at reducing tourism 
demand.  
Combining the Nordic Policy and Resilience Education allows for reductions in 
local supply and demand and creates a deterrent effect against tourism demand. Therefore, 
this policy combination was the most successful at disrupting the Las Vegas market, 
ultimately cutting supply and demand by more than half.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
With the potential for Resilience Education to successfully disrupt sexual 
exploitation in Las Vegas, policy makers should continue to explore the services and 
benefits of a such a policy. The progress of the iSeeMe program in Atlanta should be 
monitored and its curriculum adapted for Las Vegas-specific requirements. Furthermore, 
if a Resilience Education policy is implemented at the local level, policy makers must be 
cognizant of the effect of tourism demand on victimization within the market. Therefore, 
consideration must be given to developing a regional or national level curriculum to expose 
and combat exploitation that is driven by tourism. Demand reduction strategies can be an 
additional option aimed at reducing the effects of surges in tourism. Finally, policy makers 
must understand that any actions taken to reduce prostitutes within the system will come 
at the expense of an increase in victims and vice versa. The best option is to implement 
measures to reduce all aspects of the market simultaneously to negate fluctuations in 
demand and eliminate market opportunity for traffickers.  
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The models presented in this study should only be a building block for future 
research efforts that incorporate modeling sex industries and illicit networks. Longitudinal 
assessments of multiple aspects of the Las Vegas commercial sex market should be 
conducted to obtain data of higher certainty. This will allow for more accurate initial stock 
values and more complex interactions between converters. Additionally, as actual policy 
options are developed, more detailed interactions within the systems can be modeled by 
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subject matter experts prior to their implementation. As modeling is an iterative process, 
multiple iterations should be conducted to provide policy makers with the best possible 
options that avoid bounded rationality and predisposed cognitive traps regarding the 




APPENDIX. LIST OF MODEL EQUATIONS 
A. BASE MODEL 
Top-Level Model: 
Adults(t) = Adults(t - dt) + (Maturation - Death) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Adults = 400000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Maturation = DELAY(Birth, 18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Death = Adults*Death_Rate {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Children(t) = Children(t - dt) + (Birth - Maturation) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Children = 77000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Birth = (Birth_Rate*Adults)+Net_Migration_Flow {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Maturation = DELAY(Birth, 18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Prostitutes(t) = Supply_of_Prostitutes(t - dt) + (Entering_Prostitution - 
Exiting_Prostitution) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
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  INIT Supply_of_Prostitutes = 11000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Entering_Prostitution = (Adults/2)*Prostitution_Profit_Effect {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Exiting_Prostitution=Supply_of_Prostitutes*Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Prostitution/
Avg_Time_As_Participant {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Supply_of_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized - Rescued) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Victims = 5000 
  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Victimized = (Children+Adults)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Rescued=Supply_of_Victims*Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Trafficking/
Avg_Time_as_Victim {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Total_Demand(t) = Total_Demand(t - dt) + (Local_Demand + Tourism_Demand - 
Exiting_Demand - Incarcerated) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Total_Demand = 19000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
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  INFLOWS: 
      Local_Demand=(Adults/
2)*Rate_of_Local_Demand*Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
      
Tourism_Demand=Tourists_Per_year*Rate_of_Tourism_Demand*Price_Effect_on_Tou
rism_Demand {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Demand = HISTORY(Total_Demand, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
      
Incarcerated=(Total_Demand*Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_lllegal_Demand) 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Tourists_Per_year(t) = Tourists_Per_year(t - dt) + (Annual_Tourism - 
Returning_Home) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Tourists_Per_year = 42000000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Annual_Tourism= Tourists_Per_year*”%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually”+ 
(Tourists_Per_year) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Returning_Home = HISTORY(Tourists_Per_year, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
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          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
“%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually” = .018 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Annual_Cost = Total_Demand*15 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Price_Adjustment=GRAPH(DELAY(Total_Sex_Market_Supply/
Total_Demand, .25)) 
(0.100, 0.5000), (0.207692307692, 0.4568), (0.315384615385, 0.4198), 
(0.423076923077, 0.3736), (0.530769230769, 0.3396), (0.638461538462, 0.2841), 
(0.746153846154, 0.2132), (0.853846153846, 0.1093), (0.961538461538, 0.0423), 
(1.06923076923, -0.0051), (1.17692307692, -0.0470), (1.28461538462, -0.0637), 
(1.39230769231, -0.0833), (1.500, -0.1000) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Profit = ((Total_Demand*Price)-Annual_Cost)*Avg_Number_of_Clients 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Year 
Avg_Number_of_Clients = 84 
  UNITS: People/Person/year 
Avg_Time_As_Participant = 12 
  UNITS: Years 
Avg_Time_as_Victim = 7 
  UNITS: years 
Birth_Rate = .054 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
Death_Rate = .03 
  UNITS: People/Years 
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Initial_Price = 200 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_lllegal_Demand = .01 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Prostitution = .15 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Trafficking = .15 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Net_Migration_Flow = 30000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price = Initial_Price+(PREVIOUS(SELF,  1)*Annual_Price_Adjustment) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.756), (300.0, 0.150), (400.0, -0.081), (500.0, -0.192), 
(600.0, -0.335), (700.0, -0.390), (800.0, -0.445), (900.0, -0.467), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price_Effect_on_Tourism_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.961777777778), (300.0, 0.183), (400.0, -0.048), (500.0, -
0.203), (600.0, -0.269), (700.0, -0.346), (800.0, -0.412), (900.0, -0.445), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Profit_Per_Participant=IF(Total_Sex_Market_Supply>0)THEN(Annual_Profit/
Total_Sex_Market_Supply)ELSE(1) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
Prostitution_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
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(5000, -0.0350), (8750, -0.0212), (12500, -0.0024), (16250, 0.0138), (20000, 
0.0256), (23750, 0.0368), (27500, 0.0451), (31250, 0.0549), (35000, 0.0607), (38750, 
0.0651), (42500, 0.0671), (46250, 0.0690), (50000, 0.0700) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Rate_of_Local_Demand = .01 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Rate_of_Tourism_Demand = .0004 
  UNITS: dmnl 
“Supply/Demand” = Total_Sex_Market_Supply/Total_Demand 
  UNITS: people/year 
Total_Sex_Market_Supply = Supply_of_Victims+Supply_of_Prostitutes 
  UNITS: people/year 
Trafficking_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0120), (8214.28571429, -0.0075), (11428.5714286, -0.0020), 
(14642.8571429, 0.0056), (17857.1428571, 0.0186), (21071.4285714, 0.0342), 
(24285.7142857, 0.0483), (27500, 0.0719), (30714.2857143, 0.0789), (33928.5714286, 
0.0819), (37142.8571429, 0.0860), (40357.1428571, 0.0890), (43571.4285714, 0.0915), 
(46785.7142857, 0.0940), (50000, 0.0960) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
B. LEGALIZATION MODEL 
Top-Level Model: 
Adults(t) = Adults(t - dt) + (Maturation - Death) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Adults = 400000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
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      Maturation = DELAY(Birth, 18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Death = Adults*Death_Rate {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Children(t) = Children(t - dt) + (Birth - Maturation) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Children = 77000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Birth = (Birth_Rate*Adults)+Net_Migration_Flow {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Maturation = DELAY(Birth, 18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Prostitutes(t) = Supply_of_Prostitutes(t - dt) + (Entering_Prostitution - 
Exiting_Prostitution) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Prostitutes = 10000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Entering_Prostitution = (Adults/2)*Prostitution_Profit_Effect {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Prostitution=(Supply_of_Prostitutes*Reform_Effectiveness/
Avg_Time_As_Participant) {UNIFLOW} 
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          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Supply_of_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized - Rescued) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Victims = 5000 
  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Victimized = (Children+Adults)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Rescued=(Supply_of_Victims*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop)/Avg_Time_as_Victi
m {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Total_Demand(t) = Total_Demand(t - dt) + (Local_Demand + Tourism_Demand - 
Exiting_Demand - Incarcerated) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Total_Demand = 19000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Local_Demand=(Adults/
2)*Rate_of_Local_Demand*Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
      
Tourism_Demand=Tourists_Per_year*Rate_of_Tourism_Demand*Price_Effect_on_Tou
rism_Demand {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
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  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Demand = HISTORY(Total_Demand, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
      
Incarcerated=(Total_Demand*Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_illegal_Demand) 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Tourists_Per_year(t) = Tourists_Per_year(t - dt) + (Annual_Tourism - 
Returning_Home) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Tourists_Per_year = 42000000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Annual_Tourism= Tourists_Per_year*”%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually”+ 
(Tourists_Per_year) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Returning_Home = HISTORY(Tourists_Per_year, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
“%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually” = .018 
  UNITS: People/Year 
“%_Wanting_to_Leave_Industry” = .5 
  UNITS: people/year 
Annual_Cost = Total_Demand*15 




(0.100, 0.5000), (0.207692307692, 0.4568), (0.315384615385, 0.4198), 
(0.423076923077, 0.3736), (0.530769230769, 0.3396), (0.638461538462, 0.2841), 
(0.746153846154, 0.2132), (0.853846153846, 0.1093), (0.961538461538, 0.0423), 
(1.06923076923, -0.0051), (1.17692307692, -0.0470), (1.28461538462, -0.0637), 
(1.39230769231, -0.0833), (1.500, -0.1000) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Profit = ((Total_Demand*Price)-Annual_Cost)*Avg_Number_of_Clients 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Year 
Avg_Number_of_Clients = 84 
  UNITS: People/Person/year 
Avg_Time_As_Participant = 12 
  UNITS: Years 
Avg_Time_as_Victim = 7 
  UNITS: years 
Birth_Rate = .054 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
Death_Rate = .03 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop = .3 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Initial_Price = 200 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_illegal_Demand = .3 
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  UNITS: People/Year 
Net_Migration_Flow = 30000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price = Initial_Price+(PREVIOUS(SELF,  1)*Annual_Price_Adjustment) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.756), (300.0, 0.150), (400.0, -0.081), (500.0, -0.192), 
(600.0, -0.335), (700.0, -0.390), (800.0, -0.445), (900.0, -0.467), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price_Effect_on_Tourism_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.961777777778), (300.0, 0.183), (400.0, -0.048), (500.0, -
0.203), (600.0, -0.269), (700.0, -0.346), (800.0, -0.412), (900.0, -0.445), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Profit_Per_Participant=IF(Total_Sex_Market_Supply>0)THEN(Annual_Profit/
Total_Sex_Market_Supply)ELSE(1) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
Prostitution_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0350), (8750, -0.0212), (12500, -0.0024), (16250, 0.0138), (20000, 
0.0256), (23750, 0.0368), (27500, 0.0451), (31250, 0.0549), (35000, 0.0607), (38750, 
0.0651), (42500, 0.0671), (46250, 0.0690), (50000, 0.0700) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Rate_of_Local_Demand = .01 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Rate_of_Tourism_Demand = .0004 
  UNITS: dmnl 
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Reform_Contact_Rate=IF(Supply_of_Prostitutes>0)THEN(Yearly_Reform_Capa
city*Total_Reform_Programs/Supply_of_Prostitutes) ELSE (1) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Reform_Effectiveness= Reform_Contact_Rate*”%_Wanting_to_Leave_Industry” 
  UNITS: people/year 
Reform_Program_Development = DELAY((Work_Card_Revenue/10000000),  1) 
  UNITS: Programs 
“Supply/Demand” = Total_Sex_Market_Supply/Total_Demand 
  UNITS: people/year 
Total_Reform_Programs = Reform_Program_Development 
  UNITS: Programs 
Total_Sex_Market_Supply = Supply_of_Victims+Supply_of_Prostitutes 
  UNITS: people/year 
Trafficking_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0120), (8214.28571429, -0.0075), (11428.5714286, -0.0020), 
(14642.8571429, 0.0056), (17857.1428571, 0.0186), (21071.4285714, 0.0342), 
(24285.7142857, 0.0483), (27500, 0.0719), (30714.2857143, 0.0789), (33928.5714286, 
0.0819), (37142.8571429, 0.0860), (40357.1428571, 0.0890), (43571.4285714, 0.0915), 
(46785.7142857, 0.0940), (50000, 0.0960) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
Work_Card_Revenue=(Work_Card_Tax*Supply_of_Prostitutes)+PREVIOUS(S
ELF,  1) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Work_Card_Tax = 150 
  UNITS: dollars per year 
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Yearly_Reform_Capacity = 500 
  UNITS: people/year 
 
C. ABOLITION (NORDIC) MODEL 
Top-Level Model: 
Adults(t) = Adults(t - dt) + (Maturation - Death) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Adults = 400000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Maturation = DELAY(Birth, 18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Death = Adults*Death_Rate {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Children(t) = Children(t - dt) + (Birth - Maturation) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Children = 77000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Birth = (Birth_Rate*Adults)+Net_Migration_Flow {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Maturation = DELAY(Birth, 18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
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Supply_of_Prostitutes(t) = Supply_of_Prostitutes(t - dt) + (Entering_Prostitution - 
Exiting_Prostitution) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Prostitutes = 11000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Entering_Prostitution = (Adults/2)*Prostitution_Profit_Effect {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Prostitution = Supply_of_Prostitutes/Avg_Time_As_Participant 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Supply_of_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized - Rescued) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Victims = 5000 
  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Victimized = (Children+Adults)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Rescued=Supply_of_Victims*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop/
Avg_Time_as_Victim {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Total_Demand(t) = Total_Demand(t - dt) + (Local_Demand + Tourism_Demand - 
Exiting_Demand - Incarcerated) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Total_Demand = 19000 
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  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 




          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 





          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Demand = HISTORY(Total_Demand, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
      
Incarcerated=(Total_Demand*Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_lllegal_Demand) 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Tourists_Per_year(t) = Tourists_Per_year(t - dt) + (Annual_Tourism - 
Returning_Home) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Tourists_Per_year = 42000000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
  INFLOWS: 
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      Annual_Tourism= Tourists_Per_year*”%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually”+ 
(Tourists_Per_year) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Returning_Home = HISTORY(Tourists_Per_year, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
“%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually” = .018 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Annual_Cost = Total_Demand*15 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Price_Adjustment=GRAPH(DELAY(Total_Sex_Market_Supply/
Total_Demand, .25)) 
(0.100, 0.5000), (0.207692307692, 0.4568), (0.315384615385, 0.4198), 
(0.423076923077, 0.3736), (0.530769230769, 0.3396), (0.638461538462, 0.2841), 
(0.746153846154, 0.2132), (0.853846153846, 0.1093), (0.961538461538, 0.0423), 
(1.06923076923, -0.0051), (1.17692307692, -0.0470), (1.28461538462, -0.0637), 
(1.39230769231, -0.0833), (1.500, -0.1000) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Profit = ((Total_Demand*Price)-Annual_Cost)*Avg_Number_of_Clients 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Year 
Avg_Number_of_Clients = 84 
  UNITS: People/Person/year 
Avg_Time_As_Participant = 12 
  UNITS: Years 
Avg_Time_as_Victim = 7 
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  UNITS: years 
Birth_Rate = .054 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
Death_Rate = .03 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop = .3 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Initial_Price = 200 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_lllegal_Demand = .3 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Net_Migration_Flow = 30000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price = Initial_Price+(PREVIOUS(SELF,  1)*Annual_Price_Adjustment) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.756), (300.0, 0.150), (400.0, -0.081), (500.0, -0.192), 
(600.0, -0.335), (700.0, -0.390), (800.0, -0.445), (900.0, -0.467), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price_Effect_on_Tourism_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.961777777778), (300.0, 0.183), (400.0, -0.048), (500.0, -
0.203), (600.0, -0.269), (700.0, -0.346), (800.0, -0.412), (900.0, -0.445), (1000.0, -0.500) 




  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
Prostitution_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0350), (8750, -0.0212), (12500, -0.0024), (16250, 0.0138), (20000, 
0.0256), (23750, 0.0368), (27500, 0.0451), (31250, 0.0549), (35000, 0.0607), (38750, 
0.0651), (42500, 0.0671), (46250, 0.0690), (50000, 0.0700) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Rate_of_Local_Buyers_Deterred=GRAPH(DELAY(Law_Enforcement_Efforts_o
n_lllegal_Demand, 1)) 
(0.0100, 0.0100), (0.118888888889, 0.134822222222), (0.227777777778, 
0.236133333333), (0.336666666667, 0.352266666667), (0.445555555556, 
0.475044444444), (0.554444444444, 0.602933333333), (0.663333333333, 
0.708333333333), (0.772222222222, 0.7984), (0.881111111111, 0.893577777778), 
(0.9900, 0.9908) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Rate_of_Local_Demand = .01 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Rate_of_Tourism_Buyers_Deterred=GRAPH(DELAY(Law_Enforcement_Effort
s_on_lllegal_Demand,  1)) 
(0.0100, 0.0100), (0.118888888889, 0.134822222222), (0.227777777778, 
0.236133333333), (0.336666666667, 0.352266666667), (0.445555555556, 
0.475044444444), (0.554444444444, 0.602933333333), (0.663333333333, 
0.708333333333), (0.772222222222, 0.7984), (0.881111111111, 0.893577777778), 
(0.9900, 0.9908) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Rate_of_Tourism_Demand = .0004 
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  UNITS: dmnl 
“Supply/Demand” = Total_Sex_Market_Supply/Total_Demand 
  UNITS: people/year 
Total_Sex_Market_Supply = Supply_of_Victims+Supply_of_Prostitutes 
  UNITS: people/year 
Trafficking_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0120), (8214.28571429, -0.0075), (11428.5714286, -0.0020), 
(14642.8571429, 0.0056), (17857.1428571, 0.0186), (21071.4285714, 0.0342), 
(24285.7142857, 0.0483), (27500, 0.0719), (30714.2857143, 0.0789), (33928.5714286, 
0.0819), (37142.8571429, 0.0860), (40357.1428571, 0.0890), (43571.4285714, 0.0915), 
(46785.7142857, 0.0940), (50000, 0.0960) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
D. HYBRID MODEL 
Top-Level Model: 
Adults(t) = Adults(t - dt) + (Maturation - Death) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Adults = 400000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Maturation = DELAY(Birth, 18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Death = Adults*Death_Rate {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Children(t) = Children(t - dt) + (Birth - Maturation) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
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  INIT Children = 77000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Birth = (Birth_Rate*Adults)+Net_Migration_Flow {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Maturation = DELAY(Birth, 18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Prostitutes(t) = Supply_of_Prostitutes(t - dt) + (Entering_Prostitution - 
Exiting_Prostitution) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Prostitutes = 11000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Entering_Prostitution = (Adults/2)*Prostitution_Profit_Effect {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Exiting_Prostitution=(Supply_of_Prostitutes*Reform_Effectiveness)/Avg_Time_As_Par
ticipant {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Supply_of_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized - Rescued) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Victims = 5000 
  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
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      Victimized = (Children+Adults)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Rescued=(Supply_of_Victims*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop)/Avg_Time_as_Victi
m {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Total_Demand(t) = Total_Demand(t - dt) + (Local_Demand + Tourism_Demand - 
Exiting_Demand - Incarcerated) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Total_Demand = 19000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 




          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 





          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Demand = HISTORY(Total_Demand, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
122 
      
Incarcerated=(Total_Demand*Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Illegal_Demand) 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Tourists_Per_year(t) = Tourists_Per_year(t - dt) + (Annual_Tourism - 
Returning_Home) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Tourists_Per_year = 42000000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Annual_Tourism= Tourists_Per_year*”%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually”+ 
(Tourists_Per_year) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Returning_Home = HISTORY(Tourists_Per_year, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
“%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually” = .018 
  UNITS: People/Year 
“%_Wanting_to_Leave_Industry” = .8 
  UNITS: people/year 
Annual_Cost = Total_Demand*15 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Price_Adjustment=GRAPH(DELAY(Total_Sex_Market_Supply/
Total_Demand, .25)) 
(0.100, 0.5000), (0.207692307692, 0.4568), (0.315384615385, 0.4198), 
(0.423076923077, 0.3736), (0.530769230769, 0.3396), (0.638461538462, 0.2841), 
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(0.746153846154, 0.2132), (0.853846153846, 0.0899), (0.961538461538, -0.0026), 
(1.06923076923, -0.0952), (1.17692307692, -0.131117216117), (1.28461538462, -
0.167599332041), (1.39230769231, -0.185252316311), (1.500, -0.2) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Profit = ((Total_Demand*Price)-Annual_Cost)*Avg_Number_of_Clients 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Year 
Avg_Number_of_Clients = 84 
  UNITS: People/Person/year 
Avg_Time_As_Participant = 12 
  UNITS: Years 
Avg_Time_as_Victim = 7 
  UNITS: years 
Birth_Rate = .054 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
Death_Rate = .03 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop = .15 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Initial_Price = 200 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Illegal_Demand = .3 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Net_Migration_Flow = 30000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
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Price = Initial_Price+(PREVIOUS(SELF,  1)*Annual_Price_Adjustment) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.756), (300.0, 0.150), (400.0, -0.081), (500.0, -0.192), 
(600.0, -0.335), (700.0, -0.390), (800.0, -0.445), (900.0, -0.467), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price_Effect_on_Tourism_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.961777777778), (300.0, 0.183), (400.0, -0.048), (500.0, -
0.203), (600.0, -0.269), (700.0, -0.346), (800.0, -0.412), (900.0, -0.445), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Profit_Per_Participant=IF(Total_Sex_Market_Supply>0)THEN(Annual_Profit/
Total_Sex_Market_Supply)ELSE(1) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
Prostitution_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0350), (8750, -0.0212), (12500, -0.0024), (16250, 0.0138), (20000, 
0.0256), (23750, 0.0368), (27500, 0.0451), (31250, 0.0549), (35000, 0.0607), (38750, 
0.0651), (42500, 0.0671), (46250, 0.0690), (50000, 0.0700) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Rate_of_Local_Buyers_Deterred=GRAPH(DELAY(Law_Enforcement_Efforts_o
n_Illegal_Demand,  1)) 
(0.0100, 0.0100), (0.118888888889, 0.134822222222), (0.227777777778, 
0.236133333333), (0.336666666667, 0.352266666667), (0.445555555556, 
0.475044444444), (0.554444444444, 0.602933333333), (0.663333333333, 
0.708333333333), (0.772222222222, 0.7984), (0.881111111111, 0.893577777778), 
(0.9900, 0.9908) 
  UNITS: people/year 
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Rate_of_Local_Demand = .01 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Rate_of_Tourism_Buyers_Deterred=GRAPH(DELAY(Law_Enforcement_Effort
s_on_Illegal_Demand,  1)) 
(0.0100, 0.0100), (0.118888888889, 0.134822222222), (0.227777777778, 
0.236133333333), (0.336666666667, 0.352266666667), (0.445555555556, 
0.475044444444), (0.554444444444, 0.602933333333), (0.663333333333, 
0.708333333333), (0.772222222222, 0.7984), (0.881111111111, 0.893577777778), 
(0.9900, 0.9908) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Rate_of_Tourism_Demand = .0004 
  UNITS: dmnl 
Reform_Contact_Rate=IF(Supply_of_Prostitutes>0)THEN(Yearly_Reform_Capa
city*Total_Reform_Programs/Supply_of_Prostitutes) ELSE (1) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Reform_Effectiveness=DELAY(Reform_Contact_Rate*”%_Wanting_to_Leave_I
ndustry,”  1) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Reform_Program_Development = DELAY((Work_Card_Revenue/10000000),  1) 
  UNITS: Programs 
“Supply/Demand” = Total_Sex_Market_Supply/Total_Demand 
  UNITS: people/year 
Total_Reform_Programs = Reform_Program_Development 
  UNITS: Programs 
Total_Sex_Market_Supply = Supply_of_Victims+Supply_of_Prostitutes 
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  UNITS: people/year 
Trafficking_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0120), (8214.28571429, -0.0075), (11428.5714286, -0.0020), 
(14642.8571429, 0.0056), (17857.1428571, 0.0186), (21071.4285714, 0.0342), 
(24285.7142857, 0.0483), (27500, 0.0719), (30714.2857143, 0.0789), (33928.5714286, 
0.0819), (37142.8571429, 0.0860), (40357.1428571, 0.0890), (43571.4285714, 0.0915), 
(46785.7142857, 0.0940), (50000, 0.0960) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
Work_Card_Revenue=(Work_Card_Tax*Supply_of_Prostitutes)+PREVIOUS(S
ELF,  1) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Work_Card_Tax = 150 
  UNITS: dollars per year 
Yearly_Reform_Capacity = 500 
  UNITS: people/year 
E. VICTIM ADVOCACY MODEL 
Top-Level Model: 
Adults(t) = Adults(t - dt) + (Maturation - Death) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Adults = 400000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Maturation = DELAY(Birth, 18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Death = Adults*Death_Rate {UNIFLOW} 
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          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Children(t) = Children(t - dt) + (Birth - Maturation) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Children = 77000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Birth = (Birth_Rate*Adults)+Net_Migration_Flow {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Maturation = DELAY(Birth, 18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Prostitutes(t) = Supply_of_Prostitutes(t - dt) + (Entering_Prostitution - 
Exiting_Prostitution) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Prostitutes = 10000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Entering_Prostitution = (Adults/2)*Prostitution_Profit_Effect {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Exiting_Prostitution=(Supply_of_Prostitutes*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Prostituti
on)/Avg_Time_As_Participant {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Supply_of_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized - Rescued) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Victims = 5000 
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  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      
Victimized=(Children+Adults)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect*Effect_of_Trafficker_Convicti
on_Rate {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Rescued=(Supply_of_Victims*(Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Focus_on_Trafficking+Inc
reased_Services_Identification)/Avg_Time_as_Victim) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Total_Demand(t) = Total_Demand(t - dt) + (Local_Demand + Tourism_Demand - 
Exiting_Demand - Incarcerated) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Total_Demand = 19000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Local_Demand=(Adults/
2)*Rate_of_Local_Demand*Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
      
Tourism_Demand=Tourists_Per_year*Rate_of_Tourism_Demand*Price_Effect_on_Tou
rism_Demand {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Demand = HISTORY(Total_Demand, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
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      Incarcerated = (Total_Demand*Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Demand) 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Tourists_Per_year(t) = Tourists_Per_year(t - dt) + (Annual_Tourism - 
Returning_Home) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Tourists_Per_year = 42000000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Annual_Tourism= Tourists_Per_year*”%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually”+ 
(Tourists_Per_year) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Returning_Home = HISTORY(Tourists_Per_year, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
“%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually” = .018 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Annual_Cost = Total_Demand*15 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year/person 
Annual_Price_Adjustment=GRAPH(DELAY(Total_Sex_Market_Supply/
Total_Demand, .25)) 
(0.100, 0.5000), (0.207692307692, 0.4568), (0.315384615385, 0.4198), 
(0.423076923077, 0.3736), (0.530769230769, 0.3396), (0.638461538462, 0.2841), 
(0.746153846154, 0.2132), (0.853846153846, 0.1093), (0.961538461538, 0.0423), 
(1.06923076923, -0.0051), (1.17692307692, -0.0470), (1.28461538462, -0.0637), 
(1.39230769231, -0.0833), (1.500, -0.1000) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
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Annual_Profit = ((Total_Demand*Price)-Annual_Cost)*Avg_Number_of_Clients 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Year 
Avg_Number_of_Clients = 84 
  UNITS: People/Person/year 
Avg_Time_As_Participant = 12 
  UNITS: Years 
Avg_Time_as_Victim = 7 
  UNITS: years 
Birth_Rate = .054 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
Death_Rate = .03 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Focus_on_Trafficking = .3 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Prostitution = .15 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Effect_of_Trafficker_Conviction_Rate=GRAPH(DELAY(Effect_of_Law_Enforc
ement_Focus_on_Trafficking+Increased_Services_Identification,  1)) 
(0.0100, 0.9908), (0.1080, 0.7928), (0.2060, 0.5902), (0.3040, 0.3692), (0.4020, 
0.2540), (0.5000, 0.1896), (0.5980, 0.1343), (0.6960, 0.0929), (0.7940, 0.0560), (0.8920, 
0.0238), (0.9900, 0.0000) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Increased_Services_Identification = .10 
  UNITS: people/year 
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Initial_Price = 200 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Demand = .01 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Net_Migration_Flow = 30000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price = Initial_Price+(PREVIOUS(SELF,  1)*Annual_Price_Adjustment) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.756), (300.0, 0.150), (400.0, -0.081), (500.0, -0.192), 
(600.0, -0.335), (700.0, -0.390), (800.0, -0.445), (900.0, -0.467), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price_Effect_on_Tourism_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.961777777778), (300.0, 0.183), (400.0, -0.048), (500.0, -
0.203), (600.0, -0.269), (700.0, -0.346), (800.0, -0.412), (900.0, -0.445), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Profit_Per_Participant=IF(Total_Sex_Market_Supply>0) THEN(Annual_Profit/
Total_Sex_Market_Supply)ELSE(1) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
Prostitution_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0350), (8750, -0.0212), (12500, -0.0024), (16250, 0.0138), (20000, 
0.0256), (23750, 0.0368), (27500, 0.0451), (31250, 0.0549), (35000, 0.0607), (38750, 
0.0651), (42500, 0.0671), (46250, 0.0690), (50000, 0.0700) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Rate_of_Local_Demand = .01 
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  UNITS: People/Years 
Rate_of_Tourism_Demand = .0004 
  UNITS: dmnl 
“Supply/Demand” = Total_Sex_Market_Supply/Total_Demand 
  UNITS: people/year 
Total_Sex_Market_Supply = Supply_of_Victims+Supply_of_Prostitutes 
  UNITS: people/year 
Trafficking_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0120), (8214.28571429, -0.0075), (11428.5714286, -0.0020), 
(14642.8571429, 0.0056), (17857.1428571, 0.0186), (21071.4285714, 0.0342), 
(24285.7142857, 0.0483), (27500, 0.0719), (30714.2857143, 0.0789), (33928.5714286, 
0.0819), (37142.8571429, 0.0860), (40357.1428571, 0.0890), (43571.4285714, 0.0915), 
(46785.7142857, 0.0940), (50000, 0.0960) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
F. RESILIENCE EDUCATION MODEL 
Top-Level Model: 
Adults(t) = Adults(t - dt) + (Maturation - Death) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Adults = 400000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Maturation=DELAY(Child_Contact_Rate*Children+(Children-
Child_Contact_Rate*Children),     18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Death = Adults*Death_Rate {UNIFLOW} 
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          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Children(t) = Children(t - dt) + (Birth - Child_Contact_Rate) * dt {NON-
NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Children = 77000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Birth = (Birth_Rate*Adults)+Net_Migration_Flow {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Child_Contact_Rate = Children*.25+RAMP(Children*.75, 5)/Children 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Adult_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Adult_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized_1 - 
Rescued_1) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Adult_Victims = 2000 
  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Victimized_1=(Adults/2)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect-
(Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Rescued_1=(Supply_of_Adult_Victims*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Trafficking)/A
vg_Time_as_Victim {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
134 
Supply_of_Child_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Child_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized - 
Rescued) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Child_Victims = 3000 
  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Victimized=(Children)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect-
Effectiveness_of_Child_Resiliency_Edu {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Rescued=(Supply_of_Child_Victims*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Trafficking)/Avg
_Time_as_Victim {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Prostitutes(t) = Supply_of_Prostitutes(t - dt) + (Entering_Prostitution - 
Exiting_Prostitution) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Prostitutes = 11000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Entering_Prostitution=(Adults/2)*Prostitution_Profit_Effect-
(Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Exiting_Prostitution=(Supply_of_Prostitutes*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Prostituti
on)/Avg_Time_As_Participant {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
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Total_Demand(t) = Total_Demand(t - dt) + (Local_Demand + Tourism_Demand - 
Exiting_Demand - Incarcerated) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Total_Demand = 19000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Local_Demand=(Adults/
2)*Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand*Rate_of_Local_Demand-
Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
      
Tourism_Demand=(Tourists_Per_year*Rate_of_Tourism_Demand*Price_Effect_on_To
urism_Demand) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Demand = HISTORY(Total_Demand, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
      Incarcerated=(Total_Demand*Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Demand) 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Tourists_Per_year(t) = Tourists_Per_year(t - dt) + (Annual_Tourism - 
Returning_Home) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Tourists_Per_year = 42000000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Annual_Tourism= Tourists_Per_year*”%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually”+ 
(Tourists_Per_year) {UNIFLOW} 
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          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Returning_Home = HISTORY(Tourists_Per_year, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
“%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually” = .018 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Adult_Contact_Rate=Maturation-(Children-
Children*Child_Contact_Rate)/Adults 
  UNITS: people/year 
Annual_Cost = Total_Demand*15 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Price_Adjustment=GRAPH(DELAY(Total_Sex_Market_Supply/
Total_Demand, .25)) 
(0.100, 0.5000), (0.207692307692, 0.4568), (0.315384615385, 0.4198), 
(0.423076923077, 0.3736), (0.530769230769, 0.3396), (0.638461538462, 0.2841), 
(0.746153846154, 0.2132), (0.853846153846, 0.1093), (0.961538461538, 0.0423), 
(1.06923076923, -0.0051), (1.17692307692, -0.0470), (1.28461538462, -0.0637), 
(1.39230769231, -0.0833), (1.500, -0.1000) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Profit = ((Total_Demand*Price)-Annual_Cost)*Avg_Number_of_Clients 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Year 
Avg_Number_of_Clients = 84 
  UNITS: People/Person/year 
Avg_Time_As_Participant = 12 
  UNITS: Years 
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Avg_Time_as_Victim = 7 
  UNITS: years 
Birth_Rate = .054 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
Death_Rate = .03 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Prostitution = .15 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Trafficking = .15 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu=Success_Rate_of_Resiliency_Edu*Adu
lt_Contact_Rate 
  UNITS: people/year 
Effectiveness_of_Child_Resiliency_Edu=DELAY(Child_Contact_Rate*Success_
Rate_of_Resiliency_Edu,  1) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Initial_Price = 200 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Demand = .01 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Net_Migration_Flow = 30000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price = Initial_Price+(PREVIOUS(SELF,  1)*Annual_Price_Adjustment) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
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Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.756), (300.0, 0.150), (400.0, -0.081), (500.0, -0.192), 
(600.0, -0.335), (700.0, -0.390), (800.0, -0.445), (900.0, -0.467), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price_Effect_on_Tourism_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.961777777778), (300.0, 0.183), (400.0, -0.048), (500.0, -
0.203), (600.0, -0.269), (700.0, -0.346), (800.0, -0.412), (900.0, -0.445), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Profit_Per_Participant=IF(Total_Sex_Market_Supply>0)THEN(Annual_Profit/
Total_Sex_Market_Supply)ELSE(1) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
Prostitution_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0350), (8750, -0.0212), (12500, -0.0024), (16250, 0.0138), (20000, 
0.0256), (23750, 0.0368), (27500, 0.0451), (31250, 0.0549), (35000, 0.0607), (38750, 
0.0651), (42500, 0.0671), (46250, 0.0690), (50000, 0.0700) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Rate_of_Local_Demand = .01 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Rate_of_Tourism_Demand = .0004 
  UNITS: dmnl 
Success_Rate_of_Resiliency_Edu = .3 
  UNITS: people/year 
“Supply/Demand” = Total_Sex_Market_Supply/Total_Demand 




  UNITS: people/year 
Trafficking_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0120), (8214.28571429, -0.0075), (11428.5714286, -0.0020), 
(14642.8571429, 0.0056), (17857.1428571, 0.0186), (21071.4285714, 0.0342), 
(24285.7142857, 0.0483), (27500, 0.0719), (30714.2857143, 0.0789), (33928.5714286, 
0.0819), (37142.8571429, 0.0860), (40357.1428571, 0.0890), (43571.4285714, 0.0915), 
(46785.7142857, 0.0940), (50000, 0.0960) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
G. NORDIC-RESILIENCE COMBINATION MODEL 
Top-Level Model: 
Adults(t) = Adults(t - dt) + (Maturation - Death) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Adults = 400000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Maturation=DELAY(Child_Contact_Rate*Children+(Children-
Child_Contact_Rate*Children),     18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Death = Adults*Death_Rate {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Children(t) = Children(t - dt) + (Birth - Child_Contact_Rate) * dt {NON-
NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Children = 77000 
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  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Birth = (Birth_Rate*Adults)+Net_Migration_Flow {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Child_Contact_Rate = Children*.25+RAMP(Children*.75, 5)/Children 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Adult_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Adult_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized_1 - 
Rescued_1) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Adult_Victims = 2000 
  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Victimized_1 = (Adults/2)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect-
(Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Rescued_1=(Supply_of_Adult_Victims*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Trafficking)/A
vg_Time_as_Victim {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Child_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Child_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized - 
Rescued) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Child_Victims = 3000 
  UNITS: people/year 
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  INFLOWS: 
      Victimized=(Children)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect-
Effectiveness_of_Child_Resiliency_Edu {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Rescued=Supply_of_Child_Victims*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop/
Avg_Time_as_Victim {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Prostitutes(t) = Supply_of_Prostitutes(t - dt) + (Entering_Prostitution - 
Exiting_Prostitution) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Prostitutes = 11000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Entering_Prostitution=(Adults/2)*Prostitution_Profit_Effect-
(Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Prostitution=Supply_of_Prostitutes/Avg_Time_As_Participant 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Total_Demand(t) = Total_Demand(t - dt) + (Local_Demand + Tourism_Demand - 
Exiting_Demand - Incarcerated) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Total_Demand = 19000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
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          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 





          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Demand = HISTORY(Total_Demand, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
      
Incarcerated=(Total_Demand*Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_lllegal_Demand) 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Tourists_Per_year(t) = Tourists_Per_year(t - dt) + (Annual_Tourism - 
Returning_Home) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Tourists_Per_year = 42000000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Annual_Tourism= Tourists_Per_year*”%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually”+ 
(Tourists_Per_year) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
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  OUTFLOWS: 
      Returning_Home = HISTORY(Tourists_Per_year, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
“%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually” = .018 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Adult_Contact_Rate=Maturation-(Children-
Children*Child_Contact_Rate)//(Adults/2) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Annual_Cost = Total_Demand*15 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Price_Adjustment=GRAPH(DELAY(Total_Sex_Market_Supply/
Total_Demand, .25)) 
(0.100, 0.5000), (0.207692307692, 0.4568), (0.315384615385, 0.4198), 
(0.423076923077, 0.3736), (0.530769230769, 0.3396), (0.638461538462, 0.2841), 
(0.746153846154, 0.2132), (0.853846153846, 0.1093), (0.961538461538, 0.0423), 
(1.06923076923, -0.0051), (1.17692307692, -0.0470), (1.28461538462, -0.0637), 
(1.39230769231, -0.0833), (1.500, -0.1000) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Profit = ((Total_Demand*Price)-Annual_Cost)*Avg_Number_of_Clients 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Year 
Avg_Number_of_Clients = 84 
  UNITS: People/Person/year 
Avg_Time_As_Participant = 12 
  UNITS: Years 
Avg_Time_as_Victim = 7 
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  UNITS: years 
Birth_Rate = .054 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
Death_Rate = .03 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop = .30 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Trafficking = .3 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu=Success_Rate_of_Resiliency_Edu*Adu
lt_Contact_Rate 
  UNITS: people/year 
Effectiveness_of_Child_Resiliency_Edu=DELAY(Child_Contact_Rate*Success_
Rate_of_Resiliency_Edu,  1) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Initial_Price = 200 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_lllegal_Demand = .3 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Net_Migration_Flow = 30000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price = Initial_Price+(PREVIOUS(SELF,  1)*Annual_Price_Adjustment) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
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(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.756), (300.0, 0.150), (400.0, -0.081), (500.0, -0.192), 
(600.0, -0.335), (700.0, -0.390), (800.0, -0.445), (900.0, -0.467), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price_Effect_on_Tourism_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.961777777778), (300.0, 0.183), (400.0, -0.048), (500.0, -
0.203), (600.0, -0.269), (700.0, -0.346), (800.0, -0.412), (900.0, -0.445), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Profit_Per_Participant=IF(Total_Sex_Market_Supply>0)THEN(Annual_Profit/
Total_Sex_Market_Supply)ELSE(1) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
Prostitution_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0350), (8750, -0.0212), (12500, -0.0024), (16250, 0.0138), (20000, 
0.0256), (23750, 0.0368), (27500, 0.0451), (31250, 0.0549), (35000, 0.0607), (38750, 
0.0651), (42500, 0.0671), (46250, 0.0690), (50000, 0.0700) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Rate_of_Local_Buyers_Deterred=GRAPH(DELAY(Law_Enforcement_Efforts_o
n_lllegal_Demand, 1)) 
(0.0100, 0.0100), (0.118888888889, 0.134822222222), (0.227777777778, 
0.236133333333), (0.336666666667, 0.352266666667), (0.445555555556, 
0.475044444444), (0.554444444444, 0.602933333333), (0.663333333333, 
0.708333333333), (0.772222222222, 0.7984), (0.881111111111, 0.893577777778), 
(0.9900, 0.9908) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Rate_of_Local_Demand = .01 




(0.0100, 0.0100), (0.118888888889, 0.134822222222), (0.227777777778, 
0.236133333333), (0.336666666667, 0.352266666667), (0.445555555556, 
0.475044444444), (0.554444444444, 0.602933333333), (0.663333333333, 
0.708333333333), (0.772222222222, 0.7984), (0.881111111111, 0.893577777778), 
(0.9900, 0.9908) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Rate_of_Tourism_Demand = .0004 
  UNITS: dmnl 
Success_Rate_of_Resiliency_Edu = .4 
  UNITS: people/year 
Total_Sex_Market_Supply=Supply_of_Child_Victims+Supply_of_Prostitutes+S
upply_of_Adult_Victims 
  UNITS: people/year 
Trafficking_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0120), (8214.28571429, -0.0075), (11428.5714286, -0.0020), 
(14642.8571429, 0.0056), (17857.1428571, 0.0186), (21071.4285714, 0.0342), 
(24285.7142857, 0.0483), (27500, 0.0719), (30714.2857143, 0.0789), (33928.5714286, 
0.0819), (37142.8571429, 0.0860), (40357.1428571, 0.0890), (43571.4285714, 0.0915), 
(46785.7142857, 0.0940), (50000, 0.0960) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
H. HYBRID-RESILIENCE COMBINATION MODEL 
Top-Level Model: 
Adults(t) = Adults(t - dt) + (Maturation - Death) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Adults = 400000 
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  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Maturation=DELAY(Child_Contact_Rate*Children+(Children-
Child_Contact_Rate*Children),     18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Death = Adults*Death_Rate {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Children(t) = Children(t - dt) + (Birth - Child_Contact_Rate) * dt {NON-
NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Children = 77000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Birth = (Birth_Rate*Adults)+Net_Migration_Flow {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Child_Contact_Rate = Children*.25+RAMP(Children*.75, 5)/Children 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Adult_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Adult_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized_1 - 
Rescued_1) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Adult_Victims = 2000 
  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
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      Victimized_1=(Adults/2)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect-
(Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Rescued_1=(Supply_of_Adult_Victims*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Trafficking)/A
vg_Time_as_Victim {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Child_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Child_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized - 
Rescued) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Child_Victims = 3000 
  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Victimized=(Children)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect-
Effectiveness_of_Child_Resiliency_Edu {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Rescued=(Supply_of_Child_Victims*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop)/Avg_Time_a
s_Victim {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Prostitutes(t) = Supply_of_Prostitutes(t - dt) + (Entering_Prostitution - 
Exiting_Prostitution) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Prostitutes = 11000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
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      Entering_Prostitution=(Adults/2)*Prostitution_Profit_Effect-
(Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Exiting_Prostitution=(Supply_of_Prostitutes*Reform_Effectiveness)/Avg_Time_As_Par
ticipant {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Total_Demand(t) = Total_Demand(t - dt) + (Local_Demand + Tourism_Demand - 
Exiting_Demand - Incarcerated) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Total_Demand = 19000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 




          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 





          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Demand = HISTORY(Total_Demand, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
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          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
      
Incarcerated=(Total_Demand*Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Illegal_Demand) 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Tourists_Per_year(t) = Tourists_Per_year(t - dt) + (Annual_Tourism - 
Returning_Home) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Tourists_Per_year = 42000000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Annual_Tourism= Tourists_Per_year*”%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually”+ 
(Tourists_Per_year) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Returning_Home = HISTORY(Tourists_Per_year, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
“%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually” = .018 
  UNITS: People/Year 
“%_Wanting_to_Leave_Industry” = .5 
  UNITS: people/year 
Adult_Contact_Rate=Maturation-(Children-
Children*Child_Contact_Rate)//(Adults/2) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Annual_Cost = Total_Demand*15 




(0.100, 0.5000), (0.207692307692, 0.4568), (0.315384615385, 0.4198), 
(0.423076923077, 0.3736), (0.530769230769, 0.3396), (0.638461538462, 0.2841), 
(0.746153846154, 0.2132), (0.853846153846, 0.0899), (0.961538461538, -0.0026), 
(1.06923076923, -0.0952), (1.17692307692, -0.131117216117), (1.28461538462, -
0.167599332041), (1.39230769231, -0.185252316311), (1.500, -0.2) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Profit = ((Total_Demand*Price)-Annual_Cost)*Avg_Number_of_Clients 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Year 
Avg_Number_of_Clients = 84 
  UNITS: People/Person/year 
Avg_Time_As_Participant = 12 
  UNITS: Years 
Avg_Time_as_Victim = 7 
  UNITS: years 
Birth_Rate = .054 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
Death_Rate = .03 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop = .3 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Trafficking = .3 




  UNITS: people/year 
Effectiveness_of_Child_Resiliency_Edu=DELAY(Child_Contact_Rate*Success_
Rate_of_Resiliency_Edu,  1) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Initial_Price = 200 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_Illegal_Demand = .3 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Net_Migration_Flow = 30000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price = Initial_Price+(PREVIOUS(SELF,  1)*Annual_Price_Adjustment) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.756), (300.0, 0.150), (400.0, -0.081), (500.0, -0.192), 
(600.0, -0.335), (700.0, -0.390), (800.0, -0.445), (900.0, -0.467), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price_Effect_on_Tourism_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.961777777778), (300.0, 0.183), (400.0, -0.048), (500.0, -
0.203), (600.0, -0.269), (700.0, -0.346), (800.0, -0.412), (900.0, -0.445), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Profit_Per_Participant=IF(Total_Sex_Market_Supply>0)THEN(Annual_Profit/
Total_Sex_Market_Supply)ELSE(1) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
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Prostitution_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0350), (8750, -0.0212), (12500, -0.0024), (16250, 0.0138), (20000, 
0.0256), (23750, 0.0368), (27500, 0.0451), (31250, 0.0549), (35000, 0.0607), (38750, 
0.0651), (42500, 0.0671), (46250, 0.0690), (50000, 0.0700) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Rate_of_Local_Buyers_Deterred=GRAPH(DELAY(Law_Enforcement_Efforts_o
n_Illegal_Demand,  1)) 
(0.0100, 0.0100), (0.118888888889, 0.134822222222), (0.227777777778, 
0.236133333333), (0.336666666667, 0.352266666667), (0.445555555556, 
0.475044444444), (0.554444444444, 0.602933333333), (0.663333333333, 
0.708333333333), (0.772222222222, 0.7984), (0.881111111111, 0.893577777778), 
(0.9900, 0.9908) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Rate_of_Local_Demand = .01 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Rate_of_Tourism_Buyers_Deterred=GRAPH(DELAY(Law_Enforcement_Effort
s_on_Illegal_Demand,  1)) 
(0.0100, 0.0100), (0.118888888889, 0.134822222222), (0.227777777778, 
0.236133333333), (0.336666666667, 0.352266666667), (0.445555555556, 
0.475044444444), (0.554444444444, 0.602933333333), (0.663333333333, 
0.708333333333), (0.772222222222, 0.7984), (0.881111111111, 0.893577777778), 
(0.9900, 0.9908) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Rate_of_Tourism_Demand = .0004 
  UNITS: dmnl 
Reform_Contact_Rate=IF(Supply_of_Prostitutes>0)THEN(Yearly_Reform_Capa
city*Total_Reform_Programs/Supply_of_Prostitutes) ELSE (1) 
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  UNITS: people/year 
Reform_Effectiveness=DELAY(Reform_Contact_Rate*”%_Wanting_to_Leave_I
ndustry,”  1) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Reform_Program_Development = DELAY((Work_Card_Revenue/10000000),  1) 
  UNITS: Programs 
Success_Rate_of_Resiliency_Edu = .4 
  UNITS: people/year 
“Supply/Demand” = Total_Sex_Market_Supply/Total_Demand 
  UNITS: people/year 
Total_Reform_Programs = Reform_Program_Development 
  UNITS: Programs 
Total_Sex_Market_Supply=Supply_of_Child_Victims+Supply_of_Prostitutes+S
upply_of_Adult_Victims 
  UNITS: people/year 
Trafficking_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0120), (8214.28571429, -0.0075), (11428.5714286, -0.0020), 
(14642.8571429, 0.0056), (17857.1428571, 0.0186), (21071.4285714, 0.0342), 
(24285.7142857, 0.0483), (27500, 0.0719), (30714.2857143, 0.0789), (33928.5714286, 
0.0819), (37142.8571429, 0.0860), (40357.1428571, 0.0890), (43571.4285714, 0.0915), 
(46785.7142857, 0.0940), (50000, 0.0960) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
Work_Card_Revenue=(Work_Card_Tax*Supply_of_Prostitutes)+PREVIOUS(S
ELF,  1) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
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Work_Card_Tax = 150 
  UNITS: dollars per year 
Yearly_Reform_Capacity = 500 
  UNITS: people/year 
I. “WORST-CASE” MODEL 
Top-Level Model: 
Adults(t) = Adults(t - dt) + (Maturation - Death) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Adults = 400000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Maturation=DELAY(Child_Contact_Rate*Children+(Children-
Child_Contact_Rate*Children),     18) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Death = Adults*Death_Rate {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Children(t) = Children(t - dt) + (Birth - Child_Contact_Rate) * dt {NON-
NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Children = 77000 
  UNITS: People/Years 
  INFLOWS: 
      Birth = (Birth_Rate*Adults)+Net_Migration_Flow {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
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      Child_Contact_Rate = Children*.25+RAMP(Children*.75, 5)/Children 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Adult_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Adult_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized_1 - 
Rescued_1) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Adult_Victims = 5000 
  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Victimized_1=(Adults/2)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect-
(Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      
Rescued_1=(Supply_of_Adult_Victims*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Trafficking)/A
vg_Time_as_Victim {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Child_Victims(t) = Supply_of_Child_Victims(t - dt) + (Victimized - 
Rescued) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Child_Victims = 5000 
  UNITS: people/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Victimized=(Children)*Trafficking_Profit_Effect-
Effectiveness_of_Child_Resiliency_Edu {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
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      Rescued=Supply_of_Child_Victims*Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop/
Avg_Time_as_Victim {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
Supply_of_Prostitutes(t) = Supply_of_Prostitutes(t - dt) + (Entering_Prostitution - 
Exiting_Prostitution) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Supply_of_Prostitutes = 30000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Entering_Prostitution=(Adults/2)*Prostitution_Profit_Effect-
(Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Prostitution=Supply_of_Prostitutes/Avg_Time_As_Participant 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Total_Demand(t) = Total_Demand(t - dt) + (Local_Demand + Tourism_Demand - 
Exiting_Demand - Incarcerated) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Total_Demand = 64000 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
  INFLOWS: 




          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
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          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Exiting_Demand = HISTORY(Total_Demand, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
      
Incarcerated=(Total_Demand*Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_lllegal_Demand) 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: people/person/year/Years 
Tourists_Per_year(t) = Tourists_Per_year(t - dt) + (Annual_Tourism - 
Returning_Home) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  INIT Tourists_Per_year = 42000000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
  INFLOWS: 
      Annual_Tourism= Tourists_Per_year*”%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually”+ 
(Tourists_Per_year) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      Returning_Home = HISTORY(Tourists_Per_year, TIME) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: People/Years/Years 
“%_Increase_in_Tourism_Annually” = .018 




  UNITS: people/year 
Annual_Cost = Total_Demand*15 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Price_Adjustment=GRAPH(DELAY(Total_Sex_Market_Supply/
Total_Demand, .25)) 
(0.100, 0.5000), (0.207692307692, 0.4568), (0.315384615385, 0.4198), 
(0.423076923077, 0.3736), (0.530769230769, 0.3396), (0.638461538462, 0.2841), 
(0.746153846154, 0.2132), (0.853846153846, 0.1093), (0.961538461538, 0.0423), 
(1.06923076923, -0.0051), (1.17692307692, -0.0470), (1.28461538462, -0.0637), 
(1.39230769231, -0.0833), (1.500, -0.1000) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Annual_Profit = ((Total_Demand*Price)-Annual_Cost)*Avg_Number_of_Clients 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Year 
Avg_Number_of_Clients = 84 
  UNITS: People/Person/year 
Avg_Time_As_Participant = 12 
  UNITS: Years 
Avg_Time_as_Victim = 7 
  UNITS: years 
Birth_Rate = .054 
  UNITS: people/person/year 
Death_Rate = .03 
  UNITS: People/Years 
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Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_Coop = .15 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Effect_of_Law_Enforcement_on_Trafficking = .15 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Effectiveness_of_Adult_Resiliency_Edu=Success_Rate_of_Resiliency_Edu*Adu
lt_Contact_Rate 
  UNITS: people/year 
Effectiveness_of_Child_Resiliency_Edu=DELAY(Child_Contact_Rate*Success_
Rate_of_Resiliency_Edu,  1) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Initial_Price = 200 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Law_Enforcement_Efforts_on_lllegal_Demand = .15 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Net_Migration_Flow = 30000 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price = Initial_Price+(PREVIOUS(SELF,  1)*Annual_Price_Adjustment) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars Per Year 
Price_Effect_on_Local_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.756), (300.0, 0.150), (400.0, -0.081), (500.0, -0.192), 
(600.0, -0.335), (700.0, -0.390), (800.0, -0.445), (900.0, -0.467), (1000.0, -0.500) 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Price_Effect_on_Tourism_Demand = GRAPH(Price) 
(100.0, 2.000), (200.0, 0.961777777778), (300.0, 0.183), (400.0, -0.048), (500.0, -
0.203), (600.0, -0.269), (700.0, -0.346), (800.0, -0.412), (900.0, -0.445), (1000.0, -0.500) 
161 
  UNITS: People/Year 
Profit_Per_Participant = IF (Total_Sex_Market_Supply>0) THEN(Annual_Profit/
Total_Sex_Market_Supply)ELSE(1) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/person 
Prostitution_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0350), (8750, -0.0212), (12500, -0.0024), (16250, 0.0138), (20000, 
0.0256), (23750, 0.0368), (27500, 0.0451), (31250, 0.0549), (35000, 0.0607), (38750, 
0.0651), (42500, 0.0671), (46250, 0.0690), (50000, 0.0700) 
  UNITS: U.S. Dollars/Person 
Rate_of_Local_Buyers_Deterred=GRAPH(DELAY(Law_Enforcement_Efforts_o
n_lllegal_Demand, 1)) 
(0.0100, 0.0100), (0.118888888889, 0.134822222222), (0.227777777778, 
0.236133333333), (0.336666666667, 0.352266666667), (0.445555555556, 
0.475044444444), (0.554444444444, 0.602933333333), (0.663333333333, 
0.708333333333), (0.772222222222, 0.7984), (0.881111111111, 0.893577777778), 
(0.9900, 0.9908) 
  UNITS: people/year 
Rate_of_Local_Demand = .15 
  UNITS: People/Years 
Rate_of_Tourism_Buyers_Deterred=GRAPH(DELAY(Law_Enforcement_Effort
s_on_lllegal_Demand, 1)) 
(0.0100, 0.0100), (0.118888888889, 0.134822222222), (0.227777777778, 
0.236133333333), (0.336666666667, 0.352266666667), (0.445555555556, 
0.475044444444), (0.554444444444, 0.602933333333), (0.663333333333, 
0.708333333333), (0.772222222222, 0.7984), (0.881111111111, 0.893577777778), 
(0.9900, 0.9908) 
  UNITS: people/year 
162 
Rate_of_Tourism_Demand = .0008 
  UNITS: people/year 
Success_Rate_of_Resiliency_Edu = .4 
  UNITS: people/year 
Total_Sex_Market_Supply=Supply_of_Child_Victims+Supply_of_Prostitutes+S
upply_of_Adult_Victims 
  UNITS: people/year 
Trafficking_Profit_Effect = GRAPH(Profit_Per_Participant) 
(5000, -0.0120), (8214.28571429, -0.0075), (11428.5714286, -0.0020), 
(14642.8571429, 0.0056), (17857.1428571, 0.0186), (21071.4285714, 0.0342), 
(24285.7142857, 0.0483), (27500, 0.0719), (30714.2857143, 0.0789), (33928.5714286, 
0.0819), (37142.8571429, 0.0860), (40357.1428571, 0.0890), (43571.4285714, 0.0915), 
(46785.7142857, 0.0940), (50000, 0.0960) 
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